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INTRODUCTION
Investing in a closely held corporation is a risky proposition unless you hold
the controlling stake or have bargained for additional protections. Your invest-
ment is likely to be a large percentage of your total wealth,1 and, although you
may rely upon family relationships or friendships, those are not legal protec-
tions. Indeed, family quarrels and soured friendships often lead to punitive
business consequences. You may be removed from the board of directors; if you
are an employee, you may be fired. Dividends may be withheld while the
majority takes compensation in the form of salary. Under the business judgment
rule, ordinary personnel and dividend decisions are not subject to judicial
review. So consider your options. You could try to sell your stock, in order to
exit the corporation, but who would step into your shoes, and at what price?2
You might advocate for your interests, using your voice to improve your
circumstances, but who would listen?3
1. Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 384 (2004).
2. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) (“No
outsider would knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minority. The outsider would have
the same difficulties.”).
3. See In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that the minority
shareholder “may be without either a voice in protecting his or her interests or any reasonable means of
withdrawing his or her investment”). In a public corporation, shareholders can always take the “Wall
Street walk” and sell stock, a power that, in aggregate, gives managers reason to keep shareholders
content. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 4–5 (1970) (identifying economic pressure (“exit”) and political
influence (“voice”) as the two primary mechanisms a firm’s members or customers may have available
to protect their interests).
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Despite these risks, most corporations are closely held.4 The close corpora-
tion form of business organization offers a winning combination of stability,
structure, and limited liability while also permitting direct and relatively infor-
mal management.5 Yet, the very features that appeal to investors—a locked-in
structure6 and centralized control7—enable the majority to deprive the minority
of a return on its investment.8
The potential for minority shareholder oppression should be understood,
therefore, as an inherent structural characteristic of the close corporation form.9
This characteristic creates a dilemma for courts and state legislatures, as well as
for legal commentators who hope to offer guidance. The question is whether it
is possible to adjust, ex post, the relationship of shareholders to remedy
shareholder oppression while preserving the aspects of the close corporation
form that investors value ex ante.10
4. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND
LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:2, at 1-7 (rev. 3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS] (noting absence of “reliable figures” but citing one estimate “that 95% of all corpora-
tions have 10 or fewer shareholders” (citing Alfred F. Conrad, The Corporate Consensus: A Prelimi-
nary Exploration, 63 CAL. L. REV. 440, 458–59 (1975))). For most such small firms, it would not be
realistic or advisable to become publicly traded. The decision for investors is whether to incorporate or
operate instead as a partnership or limited liability company.
5. In several states, shareholders may affirmatively choose close corporation status, but “courts
recognize the special needs of close corporations even in the absence of statute.” JAMES D. COX &
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 384 (2d ed. 2003); see also Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d
1215, 1217 n.1 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that corporation “qualifies as a close corporation because it is a
family-run business with only three shareholders” even though it “was not organized under the Illinois
Close Corporation Act”). Unlike public corporations, close corporations have no publicly traded stock,
and their shareholders usually manage the business directly as directors, officers, and employees.
6. Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in
the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting
for the Omelet To Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J.
CORP. L. 913, 916 (1999) [hereinafter Rock & Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet To Set] (“The lack of a
public market causes the parties to be locked into their investments to a much greater extent than in
either the partnership or the publicly traded corporation.”).
7. Cf. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (RUPA) § 401(f) (1997) (“Each partner has equal rights in the
management and conduct of the partnership business.”); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (UPA) § 24 (1914) (defining
“property rights of a partner” to include the “right to participate in the management”). Close corpora-
tion shareholders have no established right of participation.
8. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC
MEMBERS § 3:1, at 3-2 (rev. 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION].
9. See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699,
699 (1993) [hereinafter Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action] (“The statutory norms of
centralized control and majority rule, when combined with the lack of a public market for shares in a
close corporation, leave a minority shareholder vulnerable in a way that is distinct from the risk faced
by investors in public corporations.”).
10. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 4, § 1:5, at 1-16 (“The close
corporation statutes and cases described in this treatise have provided a rich environment for working
out issues at the intersection of contract (including the parties choice of a business form), the statutory
norms, and the role of ex post judicial relief in contexts where the lack of a market and the combination
of entity permanence and centralized control work to frustrate the expectations of investors in closely
held businesses.”); MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 1011 (1995) (observing
that while “it seems reasonable to assume that most people who want to invest both human and
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None of the three principal judicial approaches to the problem of minority
shareholder oppression is satisfactory. Some courts, reluctant to upset the
balance of corporate control to provide “special” un-bargained-for protection to
minority shareholders, judge shareholder disputes in close corporations by the
same standards applicable to public corporations.11 This overly deferential view,
referred to herein as a “Bad Faith” approach, treats the close corporation as if it
were a public corporation, effectively ignoring the salient differences (including
lack of liquidity) that make oppression possible. Minority shareholders are
presumed not to value, or else to have priced-in before investing, any protec-
tions that might otherwise appear to be missing.
Other courts focus on the vulnerability of minority shareholders, and, with
little regard for ex ante motivations for incorporation, hold majority sharehold-
ers to the enhanced fiduciary duties expected of partners, treating the close
corporation as a partnership “clothed” in corporate form.12 This “Fiduciary
Duty” approach elides the differences between partnerships and corporations,
creating uncertainty as to whether the corporate form will be respected or
whether the majority must run the corporation to serve the interests of the
minority.13
Increasingly, courts have adopted a “Reasonable Expectations” approach
financial capital in a particular enterprise would choose to organize as a general partnership because the
default rules supplied by that body of law are most conducive to a consensus model of governance[,]
. . . considerations of limited liability, organizational stability and, in some cases, taxes may tip the
balance in favor of incorporation” (footnote omitted)); Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely
Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369, 375 (1995) (“Close corpora-
tions, whose disputes occur in nonrepeating end-game situations, may prefer flexible judicial decision-
making to rigid legislative rules.”).
11. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993) (“It would do violence to normal
corporate practice . . . to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-imposed stockholder
buy-out for which the parties had not contracted.”); Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 648 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1994) (“[D]irectors have the power to control and direct the affairs of the corporation, and in the
absence of fraud, courts will generally not interfere on behalf of a dissatisfied stockholder with the
discretion of the directors . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original)).
A number of scholars share the view “that the oppression ‘cure’ is worse than the disease.” John H.
Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority Oppression in the Closely Held
Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 660 n.14 (2007) (citing scholarship without endorsing view). For a
thorough discussion and a qualified endorsement, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 228–43 (1991).
12. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 598 (Mass. 1975). Many
legal commentators contend that minority shareholders deserve additional protection. See, e.g., Mathe-
son & Maler, supra note 11, at 662 (proposing automatic right of exit); Thompson, The Shareholder’s
Cause of Action, supra note 9, at 702 (“Traditional corporate norms, oriented as they are toward
publicly held corporations, proved unsuitable for close corporations.”).
13. For an argument that default fiduciary duties should be applied only to relationships where one
party delegates complete control to another, see Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 209, 212 (“Broad delegation means management power that is not subject to limitations or
constraints such as the purported owner’s active monitoring or approval power . . . .”). Professor
Ribstein observes that, in this paradigm situation, “managers are subject to a duty of unselfishness” and
“have a legal duty to forego gain from the relationship exceeding agreed compensation.” Id. at 216
(emphasis in original). Ribstein contends that the duty of good faith is better suited to partnership-type
firms because it “does not demand foregoing self-interested conduct, but rather only refraining from the
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which measures oppression by asking whether minority shareholders have been
deprived of some benefit that they were reasonably entitled to expect.14 To the
extent courts seek to ascertain and enforce the parties’ true bargain, rather than
simply requiring controlling shareholders to abide by a norm of unselfishness,
Reasonable Expectations invites a more careful and context-based adjudication.
However, the approach is circular because whether a given expectation is
“reasonable” depends upon whether the court holds that shareholders owe one
another the limited duties of shareholders in a corporation (the Bad Faith
approach), the enhanced obligations of partnership law (the Fiduciary Duty
approach), or perhaps, some other set of rights and obligations.15 Reasonable
Expectations analysis, then, begs the question of what is reasonable. Also,
litigation concerning the nature of a bargain as originally envisioned (and as it
has evolved over time) can embroil shareholders in protracted and expensive
litigation and consume substantial judicial resources.
Rather than insisting upon strained comparisons to public corporation or
partnership models of governance, courts should minimize deterrents to minor-
ity investment by preventing majority shareholders from taking unfair advan-
tage of their power while also recognizing the majority shareholders’ right to
benefit from control in order to encourage their investment.16 Ultimately, the
question is straightforward: do the controlling shareholders have a legitimate
business purpose, or are they acting from a selfish desire to exclude the minority
from the benefits of ownership in order to enjoy those benefits on a non-pro-rata
basis?17 That question can and should be asked under any of the three existing
particular sort of self-interested conduct that is proscribed by the parties’ contract, broadly construed.”
Id. at 222.
14. See Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts: Is the Shareholder
Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1002 (2001) [hereinafter Moll, Reasonable
Expectations] (stating that “the ‘reasonable expectations’ standard garners the most approval, and
courts have increasingly used it to determine whether oppressive conduct has taken place”).
15. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy in the Close Corporation, 60
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 844 (2003) [hereinafter Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy]
(observing that defining shareholder oppression in terms of “reasonable expectations” does little more
than “simply rephrase[] the fundamental question”).
16. To the extent a tradeoff must be made between investment value and basic notions of fairness,
sympathy for the disadvantaged minority shareholder will come at the expense of the overall value of
the close corporation form. However, if the goal is to maximize total investment, and if we further
assume that potential minority and majority shareholders are equally responsive to changes in legal
doctrine, there is no reason to assume that any safeguards against minority shareholder oppression will
reduce the value of the firm. The majority may be indifferent to a standard that prevents it from
opportunistically grabbing the minority’s investment; the minority may require such protection as a
condition of investment, and, given transaction cost considerations, the existence of judicial discretion
to police the parties’ conduct ex post may determine whether socially valuable investment takes place.
17. To be sure, there are decisions that, by their terms, appear to require the majority to respect the
minority’s interests apart from any business justifications. See, e.g., Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d 551, 564 (N.C. 1983) (defining reasonable expectations as analysis of minority’s “rights and
interest,” not majority’s conduct, but also holding that minority’s responsibility for any frustration of
expectations must be taken into account). Courts may differ in principle as to whether an action that
harms minority shareholders can be legitimate—whether it is appropriate to investigate the majority’s
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approaches to minority shareholder oppression.
The key to improving the adjudication of shareholder disputes in close
corporations, consistent with current law, is recognizing the procedural dimen-
sion of the problem: courts must determine the level of scrutiny to apply in
deciding whether a claim of shareholder oppression has merit.18 Apparent
doctrinal differences may be overstated, and they obscure the critical issue of
judicial review.19 In large part, current approaches to identifying shareholder
oppression can be understood as embodying points along a range of possible
scrutiny.20 What matters is not just what courts look for in evaluating claims of
minority shareholder oppression, but the extent to which they defer to the
controlling shareholders’ business judgment.
This Article contends that courts should (1) embrace the principle that the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny may vary and (2) use minority shareholder
participation in governance to determine the proper level of scrutiny. If the
minority lacks a voice in the business, courts should apply enhanced scrutiny,
accepting general pleadings and requiring controlling shareholders to show a
legitimate business purpose for challenged conduct.21 When adjudicating claims
of shareholder oppression in close corporations with substantial minority partici-
pation—paradigmatically, representation on the board of directors—courts should
apply more relaxed scrutiny, giving substantial deference to the majority’s
business judgment absent evidence of self-dealing or bad faith.22
rationale for the decision—but few courts would in practice require a business to go bankrupt to cater to
minority shareholders or, conversely, would permit majority shareholders to reduce the value of the
minority’s interest to zero. See infra section III.A.
18. Cf. Robert B. Thompson, Mapping Judicial Review: Sinclair v. Levien, in THE ICONIC CASES IN
CORPORATE LAW 79, 79 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008) (“The intensity of judicial review of corporate
decisions is the central issue of corporate law.”).
19. See DOOLEY, supra note 10, at 1057 (“How many of these apparent differences reflect real
disagreements about substance and how many are merely rhetorical differences is debatable . . . .”).
Many courts recognize that majority shareholders control the corporation and hold them to (at least) the
same fiduciary obligations applicable to directors of public corporations. The fiduciary duty follows
control. See, e.g., Welch v. Via Christi Health Partners, Inc., 133 P.3d 122, 137 (Kan. 2006) (“[A]
director of a corporation owes a high fiduciary duty to the other stockholders of the corporation.”).
20. The extent to which a court is willing to defer to the majority’s proffered justification may often
be outcome determinative. In most cases, the majority will be able to offer a facially plausible business
explanation for challenged conduct, and the minority will assert that the justifications are a pretense and
that the majority’s true purpose was to extract improper benefits from the corporation, to disadvantage
the minority, or the like. As discussed infra section III.A, the intensity of judicial review matters greatly
in any case where the factors relevant to an assessment of business purpose can legitimately be
disputed.
21. As used in this Article, the concept of minority “voice” includes a meaningful opportunity to
review information relevant to important corporate governance decisions and to participate in the
decisionmaking process. When the minority’s voice has been obstructed, judicial scrutiny should be at
its most intense. However, as discussed infra section III.B.1, minority voice need not include any
ability to alter the outcome through voting power or veto rights.
22. Even relaxed scrutiny of oppression claims would be more searching than the business judgment
rule, which is so deferential that some scholars have described it as, essentially, a doctrine of abstention.
See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 243 (2002). Despite judicial reluctance
to substitute a court’s judgment concerning business matters for those charged with managing the
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The recommended model accommodates a range of current approaches to
shareholder oppression, improving upon them in a number of respects. First,
variable scrutiny based on voice would avoid the systematic under- or over-
protection of minority shareholders that can result from rigid application of
existing Bad Faith and Fiduciary Duty approaches. Indeed, the recommended
procedural flexibility can be defended as a formalization of the case-specific
analysis many courts already apply.23 In jurisdictions that follow a Reasonable
Expectations approach, initial consideration of minority shareholder voice would
help focus the court’s inquiry, reducing the cost and uncertainty of litigation.
Second, by giving explicit priority to minority shareholder voice, the voice-
based framework remedies an oversight in current doctrine.24 Exit-focused
approaches can have unhappy consequences: courts may either state the obvi-
ous, that close corporations are not conducive to exit, and leave the minority no
better off, or they may create exit rights that undermine one of the fundamental
characteristics of the close corporation. Voice deserves attention as an alterna-
tive mechanism for satisfying minority shareholder interests.25 Voice matters to
minority shareholders not only as a procedural protection, but often as, in itself,
a central benefit of the investment.26
Third, the proposed model would be more efficient. The cheapest lawsuits are
business, minority shareholders could present evidence of a lack of legitimate business purpose, and the
legitimacy of corporate action could perhaps be assessed, in part, by considering its impact on minority
shareholders. Minority shareholders cannot, however, escape the business judgment rule in all circum-
stances solely by virtue of their minority status. The rule would still protect the majority from
allegations that it violated its fiduciary duty of care to the detriment of the corporation as a whole. See,
e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980) (affirming dismissal of
derivative claim brought by minority shareholder that alleged majority failed to procure adequate
insurance and to invest corporate funds in interest-bearing accounts).
23. See, e.g., Cooke v. Fresh Express Foods Corp., 7 P.3d 717, 722 (Or. 2000) (“[A]ttempts to define
what oppressive conduct is . . . have proved elusive, and cases of this sort depend heavily on their
specific facts.”); Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 266 (S.C. 2001) (finding
that “the definition of oppression has been left to judicial construction on a case-by-case basis”). The
available parameters of scrutiny would vary state by state, depending on whether the state has adopted a
heightened fiduciary standard, requires bad faith conduct on the part of the majority, or has moved in
the direction of an approach based on reasonable minority expectations.
24. See, e.g., Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 661 (observing that “the development of
[minority shareholder oppression] law involves a desire by courts and legislatures to provide an exit
strategy for minority owners in closely held businesses”).
25. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 4–5.
26. See, e.g., O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 4, § 1:9, at 1-36 (“[T]he
shareholder in a close corporation considers himself or herself as a co-owner of the business and wants
the privileges and powers that go with ownership.”). Recent proposals for increasing shareholder voice
in the public-corporation context reject the idea that there is any inherent value in shareholder voice or
that political ideas might inform corporate governance. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 678 (2007) (“[I]ncreased shareholder power to replace
directors would be desirable if and only if such a change would improve corporate performance and
value. . . . I do not view ‘shareholder voice’ and ‘corporate democracy’ as ends in themselves . . . .”).
Indeed, Bebchuk states that his “support for reforming corporate elections is not motivated by political
ideas but rather by the goal of making a market institution—the modern publicly traded company—
function better.” Id. By contrast, this Article’s advocacy of minority shareholder voice in close
corporation governance does rely upon the political benefits of participation, because close corporations
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the ones that never happen; creating an incentive for close corporations to
respect minority shareholder voice would reduce the number of governance
breakdowns that lead to litigation.27 Even if the amount of litigation stayed
constant, a voice-based framework would still offer efficiency benefits. Courts
could reserve the most time-consuming, intense scrutiny—setting aside the
business judgment rule and undertaking a detailed analysis of all contested
facts—for those corporations without minority participation. A corporation that
excludes minority voice is less likely to take into account minority shareholder
interests, and, because the minority will have only limited access to informa-
tion, majority shareholders are best positioned to justify a contested decision
that harms minority shareholders.28
Although some scholars may object that voice-based scrutiny would disre-
gard the choice of business form made by the parties,29 altering the bargain they
thought they had, that objection is misplaced. The proposed framework does not
change substantive doctrine or impose a new fiduciary obligation; rather, to the
extent controlling shareholders are already subject to mandatory fiduciary duties
preventing them from appropriating the value of the minority’s investment, this
Article contends that courts need not judge claims of shareholder oppression
using a one-size-fits-all standard of review and should place the burden on the
are, in some respects, non-market organizations. For example, to describe a family run business strictly
in market terms is to miss much of what motivates its shareholders.
27. By applying stricter scrutiny to those close corporations that dispense with important procedural
opportunities for minority shareholder participation (such as annual shareholder meetings) or that
deliberately shut out minority voice, this Article’s proposal would create an incentive for close
corporations to adopt inclusive governance models. An economist might object to the supposed benefits
of a proposal that could be implemented by market participants without coercion. Arguably, an efficient
market would already supply that form of governance arrangement if it were desirable. This possible
objection overstates the efficiency of markets, especially in the close corporation context where
business relationships may intertwine with family relationships. Also, the market for close corporation
governance may not internalize the cost to society of strain on the judicial system or the potential
societal benefits that shareholder participation may create. See infra section II.C.
28. When minority shareholders have substantial voice, courts can reasonably require more detailed
factual allegations because minority shareholders have already had an opportunity to influence deci-
sions before they are made and should have access to evidence of any majority misconduct in the
decisionmaking process. Litigation costs can also be seen as an aspect of minority shareholder voice in
that the litigation mechanism is an important expressive mechanism of last resort, given the difficulty
minority shareholders have exiting close corporations.
29. In a series of articles, Professor Larry Ribstein has argued that choice of business form is an
aspect of contractual freedom and that courts that impose additional fiduciary duties may undercut the
parties’ ability to bargain for their preferred set of rights. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corpora-
tions? 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 185 (2004) [hereinafter Ribstein, Why Corporations?]; Larry E. Ribstein,
Uncorporating the Large Firm (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.
LE08-016, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1138092. Ribstein
commented online in response to an earlier draft of this Article, raising the concern that “[t]he proposal
would in effect invite courts to decide for the parties that they want voice, and give relief according to
whether they’ve provided for it.” Posting of Larry Ribstein to Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/
ideoblog/2009/01/mandatory-rules-for-closely-held-firms.html (Jan. 13, 2009, 07:29 CST).
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party best able to meet it.30
Even if the proposal could be understood to restrict the ability of parties to
customize control arrangements, because minority voice determines the level of
judicial review, the choice-of-form objection would remain unconvincing.31
One of the distinguishing features of corporate law is the mandatory fiduciary
duty of loyalty owed by controlling shareholders to the corporation—directly or
by dint of their control of the board of directors. If investors want to sharply
limit fiduciary duties, perhaps in favor of enhanced, contractual exit rights, the
choice-of-form theory indicates that they should pick a partnership or limited
liability company form more amenable to contractual modification.32
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes minority shareholder oppres-
sion as a problem of exit and voice and criticizes the three principal doctrinal
responses. Part II argues that minority shareholder voice is far more important
than courts and commentators have generally recognized and contends that
30. Controlling shareholders might invite minority participation in order to benefit from more
relaxed review in the event of litigation, but they would remain free to run the corporation however
they think best.
31. Although fiduciary duties are mandatory in that they cannot be waived in their entirety,
shareholders would remain free to bargain explicitly concerning the structure of their relationship,
including issues of voice. As a practical matter, though, minority shareholder voice may prove difficult
to address through ex ante bargaining. Board membership is probably the best proxy, but the actual
governance of a small business can easily shift from a consensus-based to an authoritarian model
depending on the personalities involved. Short of voting rules that require consensus, which, of course,
invite problems of deadlock, minority voice will substantially depend on the controlling shareholders’
attitude toward the minority. This link between majority attitude and minority voice further supports
using voice to determine the level of judicial review. For an earlier version of this point, see this
author’s online dialogue with Professor Stephen Bainbridge. Posting of Stephen Bainbridge to Professor-
Bainbridge.com, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID1967 (Jan. 4, 2009,
16:00 PST) (quoting email from this author to Professor Bainbridge); Posting of Stephen Bainbridge to
ProfessorBainbridge.com, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID1975 (Jan. 12,
2009, 16:00 PST) (quoting email from this author to Professor Bainbridge).
32. See, e.g., Ribstein, Why Corporations?, supra note 29, at 210 (arguing that corporate form is
outliving its usefulness for large, modern firms and that “partnership-type firms offer an agreement-
centered approach to centralized management that provides flexibility and adaptability”). Unlike
partnerships, “[c]orporations originated as state-created monopolies” and, because corporations are still
seen as a creation of the state, there exists “a presumption in favor of regulating corporations that does
not apply to other business associations or contracts.” Id. at 208. Whether minority investors in
contract-based LLCs should be taken to have contracted for a locked-in voiceless status if they fail to
modify default rules to avoid that problem is beyond the scope of this Article. Arguably, importing
corporate law fiduciary duties would undermine the independent significance of the LLC form and
inhibit contractual freedom. On the other hand, one might argue that any long-term, complex business
contract is likely to be incomplete in fairly significant respects and that, to avoid inefficiently expensive
ex ante bargaining, the courts should enforce fiduciary norms of conduct. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP.
L. 819, 835–36 (1999). For purposes of the argument advanced in this Article, the existence of
alternate, contract-based forms of business investment only serves to highlight that gap-filling fiduciary
duties are part of the choice made by investors who choose to do business by incorporating. With
decades of shareholder-oppression doctrine as backdrop, one might argue that the choice of close
corporation form amounts to a decision for enhanced fiduciary obligation among the shareholders.
Thus, the availability of new, hybrid business forms only makes the argument for protection of minority
shareholders in close corporations stronger.
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voice should be central to judicial analysis of minority oppression claims. Part
III offers an alternative model for adjudication that varies the level of judicial
scrutiny based upon minority shareholder voice.33 Part IV demonstrates that
courts in most jurisdictions can apply a voice-based framework in conjunction
with existing doctrine. A more flexible, voice-centered model of judicial scru-
tiny would better serve the interests of minority shareholders and the close
corporations to which they belong.
I. THE PROBLEM OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
Public corporations dominate the headlines and get far more attention from
courts, legislatures, and commentators, but most corporations are closely held.34
Minority shareholder oppression, therefore, has the potential to impact the “vast
majority of American businesses.”35 Consistent with common usage, the term
“oppression” as used in this Article encompasses all lawsuits brought by
minority shareholders against controlling shareholders, regardless of the specific
cause of action or the remedy sought.36
33. This Article’s twin arguments—that courts should apply varied scrutiny and that the level of
scrutiny should be based upon minority shareholder voice—are, it should be noted at the outset,
conceptually severable. The possibility of varying judicial scrutiny does not logically depend upon
acceptance of the importance of minority shareholder voice. Likewise, one can accept that minority
shareholder voice deserves greater weight in judicial analysis in shareholder oppression cases without
implementing that insight through changes in the level of judicial review.
34. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 4, § 1:2, at 1-7. For one well-known
definition of the close corporation, see Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505,
511 (Mass. 1975) (“We deem a close corporation to be typified by: (1) a small number of stockholders;
(2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the
management . . . of the corporation.”); cf. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 4,
§ 1:2, at 1-12 (contending that only the absence of shares traded on a securities market is critical to the
definition of a close corporation). “In contrast with the close corporation, larger corporations . . .
necessarily involve substantial separation of ownership and control, have a form of representative
government-by-the-majority, with management delegated to a board of directors, following rather
formal procedures,” and “[t]he transfer of shares is usually not only free from transfer restrictions but is
facilitated by securities exchange listing or an active over-the-counter market.” HARRY G. HENN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 507 (2d ed. 1970).
35. Siegel, supra note 1, at 378 (citations omitted).
36. See DOOLEY, supra note 10, at 1042 (“Although the term ‘oppression’ originated in involuntary
dissolution statutes, in many states it has now evolved to designate a separate cause of action for
dissident minorities in close corporations, regardless of the form of relief sought . . . .”); Thompson,
The Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra note 9, at 700 (stating that the “purposes and effects” of
statutory and common law approaches “are so sufficiently similar that it makes sense to think of them
as two manifestations of a minority shareholder’s cause of action for oppression”). For early use of
“oppression” language in the common law context, see Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 53 N.W. 218, 223
(Mich. 1892):
It cannot be denied that minority stockholders are bound hand and foot to the majority in all
matters of legitimate administration of the corporate affairs; and the courts are powerless to
redress many forms of oppression, practiced upon the minority under a guise of legal sanction,
which fall short of actual fraud.
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A. CAUSES OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION: EXIT AND VOICE
The close corporation structure lends itself to abuse of minority shareholders.
One way of describing the inherent structural potential for oppression of
minority shareholders is as a problem of “exit” and “voice”—terms that repre-
sent economic and political mechanisms for the expression and resolution of
shareholder grievances.37
1. Exit
In economic terms, minority shareholder oppression in close corporations
turns on one critical fact: minority shareholders have no practical ability to sell
their shares and exit without the majority’s consent.38 By definition, a close
corporation’s shares do not trade on a public market.39 Moreover, many close
corporations impose additional transfer restrictions designed to exclude strang-
ers to the business.40 Unlike a partnership, the close corporation form is
permanent; minority shareholders cannot ordinarily dissolve the corporation or
require the corporation to repurchase their stock.41
37. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 4–5. The use of “exit” and “voice” to frame the analysis builds upon
Albert Hirschman’s famous observation that any organization’s deterioration in quality can be counter-
acted by “exit,” “voice,” or a combination of the two. For instance, an unhappy customer can purchase
goods from a competing firm (the “exit” option) or complain about the perceived lack of quality and
seek improvement (the “voice” option). Declining sales and customer complaints may both serve to
spur change. Depending upon the circumstances, either exit or voice may be effective as a mechanism
of recuperation, and one can affect the other in a variety of ways. Where exit is impossible as a practical
matter—for example, from a family or a state—voice automatically becomes more important. Yet, the
lack of a credible threat of exit may in some circumstances diminish the effectiveness of voice. As
discussed infra section I.A.2, these considerations are of direct relevance in the context of a close
corporation, where structural exit limitations increase the importance of voice.
38. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993) (noting that “there is no market
and no market valuation” and stating that “[i]t is not difficult to be sympathetic, in the abstract, to a
stockholder who finds himself or herself in that position”). This, of course, assumes that the sharehold-
ers have not previously entered into a shareholders’ agreement creating a right of liquidity.
39. It should be noted, however, that the ability to exit from a public corporation through sale of
stock does not offer perfect protection for shareholders, who may be forced to take losses in order to
sell. See Bebchuk, supra note 26, at 716 (“[F]or shareholders concerned that poor board performance is
reducing the value of their investment, the freedom to sell their shares is hardly an adequate remedy.”);
Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 795 (2007)
(“Although a single shareholder may be able to sell a small number of shares easily, when exploited
shareholders try to sell en masse, the result is a predictable loss of value.”).
40. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 4, § 1:9, at 1-36 (explaining that
“shareholders in a close corporation commonly are greatly concerned about the identity of their
associates and have a strong desire to gain and hold the power to choose future shareholders”).
41. It is important to recognize that limited exit is not accidental but part of the close corporation’s
design. Share transfer restrictions show that shareholders value participation in a shared venture with
known members and do not want changes to upset balanced ownership. Id. (noting that shareholders
“are reluctant to run the risk of having the harmony and balance of their business organization disturbed
. . . by the unwelcome intrusion of strangers”). Fundamentally, the decision to incorporate rather than
operate as a partnership is itself evidence that shareholders disfavor exit. Where possible, shareholders
should negotiate a buy-sell agreement in advance that enables shareholders, under defined circum-
stances, to sell stock to the corporation at a price set by a specified formula. However, as discussed
infra section III.D.2, the appropriate terms for a buy-out will vary from business to business.
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The minority’s inability to exit the investment—through either market or
legal means—enables a hostile majority to “freeze out” the minority from the
benefits of ownership, for instance by excluding minority shareholders from
salaried employment while refusing to declare dividends. Minority shareholders
have no market for their shares if they believe that the business is being
mismanaged or that they are being unfairly deprived of its benefits.42 As a
consequence, a close corporation’s decision not to declare dividends can have a
large impact, such that “financially-starved minority shareholders may feel
pressure to sell their stock for a low value.”43
Although the threat of takeover can constrain abuse by the managers of a
public corporation, in that sale of stock by minority shareholders renders the
corporation vulnerable, no such market discipline exists in the close corporation
context.44 Thus, in an immediate sense, shareholder oppression stems from lack
of exit.45
2. Voice
Equally important, although less often discussed, minority shareholder oppres-
sion is a problem of voice. In broad terms, voice can be understood “as any
attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of
affairs.”46 Yet, minority shareholders often lack a meaningful ability to partici-
pate in the governance of a close corporation and may be excluded entirely from
the decisionmaking process. Depriving minority shareholders of voice poses an
especially severe problem because of the absence of reasonable exit options:
“Where exit is precluded, dissatisfied constituencies of an organization must
resort to voice; that is, because they cannot escape from the unsatisfactory
situation, they must seek to change it through internal governance mecha-
42. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975) (“In a large
public corporation, the oppressed or dissident minority stockholder could sell his stock in order to
extricate some of his invested capital. By definition, this market is not available for shares in the close
corporation.”); see Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered
Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 757 (2000) [hereinafter Moll, The Unanswered
Question]. By contrast, “[i]n the traditional public corporation, the shareholder is normally a detached
investor who neither contributes labor to the corporation nor takes part in management responsibili-
ties.” Moll, The Unanswered Question, supra, at 756–57; see also Siegel, supra note 1, at 384.
43. Siegel, supra note 1, at 384.
44. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 4, § 1:9 at 1-40. This is not to suggest
that close corporations are indifferent to product, labor, and capital markets, but that those market
incentives do not protect minority shareholders adequately from the possibility of oppression.
45. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514 (“[T]he true plight of the minority stockholder in a close
corporation becomes manifest. He cannot easily reclaim his capital.”); Charles B. Blackmar, Partner-
ship Precedents in a Corporate Setting—Exit from the Close Corporation, 7 J. CORP. L. 237 (1982)
(proposing robust exit rights consistent with partnership law); Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 661
(“We contend that the development of this area of law involves a desire by courts and legislatures to
provide an exit strategy for minority owners in closely held businesses.”); Rock & Wachter, supra note
6, at 916 (identifying the “difficulty of exit” as the “intuition that lies at the heart of the evolution of
minority shareholders’ remedies for ‘oppression’”).
46. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 30.
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nisms.”47 Minority shareholders may depend upon having a voice concerning
corporate decisions that affect the value of their investment.
To move from a conception of exit to voice is to move from an economic to a
political understanding of the firm.48 Given the intimate relationships involved
in many close corporations, and the restrictions of exit,49 a nuanced political
approach may be more appropriate than an economic one.50 By viewing share-
holder relationships in terms of the broader conception of voice, we can also
situate close corporations within “a whole gamut of human institutions, from
the state to the family, [where] voice, however ‘cumbrous,’ is all their members
normally have to work with.”51 Economics, and, by extension, the economic
analysis of law, has “a blind spot” where voice is concerned.52
Exit and voice should not, however, be viewed in isolation; the two mecha-
nisms interact in a dynamic fashion. Thus, the lack of a credible threat of exit
may diminish the effectiveness of minority voice even as it increases its
importance. However, as discussed infra in Part II, the value of minority
shareholder voice as a political mechanism does not depend on strong exit
rights. Voice represents a nuanced process involving a reasoned exchange of
views, not simply a vote tally. To the extent leverage matters, this Article’s use
of voice as the trigger for intensified judicial scrutiny would partly restore the
implicit threat of exit, potentially bolstering the impact of minority voice.53
47. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 798.
48. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 30 (“[V]oice is nothing but a basic portion and function of any
political system, known sometimes also as ‘interest articulation.’”).
49. See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law,
84 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1995) [hereinafter Thompson, Exit, Liquidity]:
[O]ur willingness to accept a different balance of majority and minority rights is affected by
the shareholder’s ability to exit from a corporation when there is a market for its shares.
Within Albert Hirschman’s structure of exit, voice, and loyalty, corporate participants have
greater exit opportunities than do political participants.
For a different perspective, see Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE
L.J. 119, 122 (2003) (arguing that corporate law does not insist on an unrealistic conception of
neutrality but offers additional appropriate protections for minorities: “Oppression is a cause of action
found not in constitutional law, but in corporate law.”).
50. See generally Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923,
924 (1984) (“[P]olitical ideas constrain or influence the form of business organizations.”).
51. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 17; cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 179 (1980) (arguing, in political context, that “a dissenting member for whom the
‘voice’ option seems unavailing should have the option of exiting and relocating in a community whose
values he or she finds more compatible”).
52. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 17 (identifying the economist’s bias against voice and in favor of
market-based exit as a tool of remediation and observing that political scientists similarly have a
“trained incapacity” when it comes to recognizing the usefulness of exit).
53. If voice cannot substitute for stronger medicine—judicially ordered buyouts and dissolution, for
example—it may make those remedies rarer. However, the fact that a lawsuit has been filed should not
count as evidence of a lack of minority voice. Otherwise, the majority would have less incentive to
provide voice to the minority in the first place. Further, to preserve the prerogative of majority rule,
courts should not assume that an unhappy minority is an oppressed minority or conflate voice with
outcome.
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B. INADEQUATE RESPONSES TO MINORITY SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION
Each state has its own method of resolving conflicts between majority and
minority shareholders in close corporations, and the approaches vary along a
number of dimensions: the nature of duties owed, whether statutory protections
are available, and the scope of remedies available.54 Nevertheless, with some
simplification, current doctrine can be grouped into three distinct categories:
Bad Faith, Fiduciary Duty, and Reasonable Expectations.55 None is adequate to
the task of identifying and remedying minority shareholder oppression.
1. Bad Faith: The Public Corporation Model
The Bad Faith approach emphasizes the fact that the owners of a close
corporation, like any other corporation, are free at the outset to negotiate for
corporate governance provisions that suit their needs.56 As Delaware’s Supreme
Court explained:
The tools of good corporate practice are designed to give a purchasing
minority stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting
with consideration. It would do violence to normal corporate practice and our
corporation law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-
imposed stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not contracted.57
In order to recover, the plaintiff cannot simply allege that a decision was
“unfair.”58 The controlling shareholders are entitled to deference under the
business judgment rule unless the plaintiff can show that the majority’s conduct
was fraudulent59 or conflicted.60 Yet, “[t]he actions that most directly impact the
54. For state-specific analysis, see Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, app. at 700–09. The trend has
been toward greater flexibility in remedying oppression. Id. at 679.
55. See id. at 675 (“Courts have settled on three primary approaches.”). For a different descriptive
claim concerning the existing doctrinal approaches to minority shareholder oppression, see Moll, The
Unanswered Question, supra note 42, at 752, 754 (contending that courts view shareholder oppression
either by examining “the propriety of the majority’s conduct” or “the effect that majority conduct has
on the minority” and advocating a “modified minority perspective” as “the only approach that enforces
the likely understandings that reasonable investors would have reached if, at the venture’s inception,
they had bargained over the protection of their investments and the prerogatives of the majority”).
Using the categories Professor Moll offers, this Article advocates a modified majority perspective—the
emphasis squarely on the legitimacy of the business purpose but informed by consideration of the effect
on the minority, especially abrogation of minority shareholder voice.
56. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379–80 (Del. 1993); Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 648
(Kan. Ct. App. 1994). Even to the extent corporation statutes afford close corporation shareholders
greater flexibility in modifying the ordinary principles of corporate governance, such “‘self help’
provisions . . . by themselves, neither create nor alter any rights or obligations among the corporate
actors.” Siegel, supra note 1, at 385.
57. Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380.
58. Id. at 1373, 1381 (noting that the basis for the lower court’s ruling was that defendants’ conduct
was “‘inherently unfair’” and reversing).
59. Richards, 879 P.2d at 648 (“‘[D]irectors have the power to control and direct the affairs of the
corporation, and in the absence of fraud, courts will generally not interfere on behalf of a dissatisfied
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minority shareholder—his or her termination and the failure to declare divi-
dends—do not involve a conflict of interest transaction between the majority
owners and the corporation.”61 If the defendants “are on both sides of the
transaction,” the “defendants have the burden of showing the entire fairness of
those transactions.”62 However, the concept of “fairness” is narrowly construed
and does not appear to require the majority to provide any unbargained-for
benefits to minority shareholders.63
Thus, courts that adopt the Bad Faith approach place their faith in private
ordering and leave it to the parties to tailor the rules to suit their circumstances.
Because courts following the Bad Faith approach view close corporations as
subject to the ordinary principles of corporations law, they ask, rhetorically,
“[w]hether there should be any special, judicially-created rules to ‘protect’
minority stockholders of closely-held . . . corporations.”64
One problem with the Bad Faith approach is that many close corporations
stockholder with the discretion of the directors on questions of corporate management, policy or
business.’” (quoting Sampson v. Hunt, 665 P.2d 743, 755 (Kan. 1983)) (emphasis removed)).
60. A related approach that might fall within the Bad Faith category defines oppression as “burden-
some, harsh and wrongful conduct, or . . . a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a
violation of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to
rely.” Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). On the one hand, that standard clearly focuses attention on the conduct of the
majority and appears to set a high bar for recovery. On the other hand, it permits a plaintiff to recover if
the majority’s conduct is deemed sufficiently “harsh” by the finder of fact and permits the plaintiff to
make that case without first having to demonstrate the inapplicability of the business judgment rule. Id.
61. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-Outs and Freeze-Outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 497, 499–500 (1995). As Professor Gevurtz observes, “under the traditional rule, courts would
apply a highly deferential level of review; for example, they might require the complaining shareholder
to prove the board’s decision was in bad faith or irrational.” Id. at 500. Yet, “[w]ithout a job and in the
absence of dividends, the minority shareholder may face an indefinite future with no return on the
capital he or she contributed to the enterprise.” Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra
note 9, at 703.
62. Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1375–76. For instance, “the majority owners’ receipt of salaries and
perquisites involves a conflict of interest” but “courts find a substantial range of compensation to be fair
and, at best, such a challenge will give the squeezed-out shareholder only limited leverage in obtaining
some benefit from the corporation.” Gevurtz, supra note 61, at 500.
63. In Nixon, for example, the court approved a series of majority actions, including the creation of a
stock option plan and the funding of “key man” life insurance that guaranteed liquidity for the
controlling shareholders and held that, as passive investors, the minority shareholders were “entitled to
be treated fairly but not necessarily to be treated equally.” Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1379. The court did not
endeavor to explain what, if anything, fair treatment might require.
64. Id. at 1379 (emphasis added). Of course, characterizing shareholder oppression doctrine as
“special” telegraphs the answer, and the court treated the comparison of close corporation to public
corporation as dispositive, conflating the metaphor with reality. In Nixon, the court noted that the
shareholders had chosen not to elect statutory close corporation status, but, as the court effectively
acknowledged, that was a distinction without a difference, because the statutory provisions offered
nothing more than flexibility in the initial formation of the corporation and provided no default
protections for minority shareholders frozen out by a hostile majority. Id. at 1380 n.19 (“We do not
intend to imply that, if the Corporation had been a close corporation under Subchapter XIV, the result in
this case would have been different.”). Close corporation statutes like Delaware’s that offer flexibility
may be useful for planning purposes (though counsel can usually accomplish the same result under
general corporate statutes) but offer little or no help in resolving claims of shareholder oppression.
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arise out of a family context, or else involve close friendships.65 There is often
no arms-length negotiation involved and investors may systematically underesti-
mate the likelihood of future conflict.66 To the extent the Bad Faith approach
assumes that minority investors price-in the possibility of oppression, because
they will internalize the harm, it relies upon a thin conception of the economi-
cally rational person and ignores the insights of behavioral economics.67 More-
over, to the extent the corporation has few initial assets, there may also be
rational impediments to incurring the bargaining costs necessary for a more
fully developed contractual relationship.68
A second difficulty is that, by placing the onus on minority shareholders to
demonstrate egregious majority misconduct, the Bad Faith approach can lead
courts to adopt too deferential a posture, even when there is evidence of
self-dealing. This is particularly true when courts ignore issues of minority
voice. If the minority is excluded from decisionmaking, it is also unlikely to
have concrete evidence of wrongdoing.
For example, in Stuparich v. Harbor Furniture Manufacturing,69 a California
appellate court applied the traditional corporate law norm that the business
judgment of those managing a corporation deserves substantial deference and
failed to give sufficient weight to aspects of the close corporation context that
suggested the majority’s judgment might be conflicted.
Among other disagreements, plaintiffs (who were sisters of the defendant)
alleged that the corporation continued to operate a money-losing furniture
business because it enabled defendant, his wife, and his son to “draw salaries
65. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra note 9, at 702.
66. See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The
Case of Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329, 1333–35 (reviewing strategic explanations
for incomplete agreements, as well as explanations based on shareholder ignorance, and contending that
psychological limitations that prevent shareholders from choosing according to their own preferences
offer a more convincing explanation).
67. For a collection of important work in this area, see CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). Empirical investigation concerning price discounts for
minority investment might reveal the extent to which minority shareholders conform to the classical
model of economic rationality. For instance, it would be interesting to know whether non-controlling
shareholders receive larger discounts in jurisdictions that offer less protection against opportunistic
behavior by the majority. (Indeed, it would be instructive to know how often minority shareholder
investors in family corporations ask for any discount to reflect their lack of control). In this vein, one
commentator suggests that pricing information could be used to resolve particular shareholder disputes.
See Robert C. Illig, Minority Investor Protections as Default Norms: Using Price To Illuminate the
Deal in Close Corporations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (2006).
68. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 34 (stating that “[c]orporate law—and in
particular the fiduciary principle enforced by courts—fills in the blanks and oversights with the terms
that people would have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able to transact
costlessly in advance”); Moll, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 14, at 993, 995 (contending that
many elements of a shareholder relationship are implied and that “when the oppression doctrine
safeguards reasonable expectations, oppression law is effectively stepping in for contract law and is
accomplishing what contract law itself should be doing”).
69. Stuparich v. Harbor Furniture Mfg., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313 (Ct. App. 2000).
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and other compensation well exceeding $200,000 per year.”70 The court held
that “[a]s holders of a minority of the voting shares, plaintiffs are not entitled to
substitute their business judgment for their brother’s with respect to viability of
the furniture operations.”71
The court noted, correctly, that the minority shareholders held part of their
interest in non-voting shares, “[p]erhaps the most traditional way of allocating
control of a corporation.”72 Despite acknowledging that “[o]ut of frustration,
and perhaps out of fear, plaintiffs have chosen not to participate further in the
meetings of the board of directors,” the court concluded there was “no evidence
of bad faith conduct” by the majority shareholder, plaintiffs’ brother.73 This
conclusion was reached notwithstanding the court’s awareness of “a serious
argument between” the shareholders “which resulted in physical injuries” to one
of the sisters.74
The court appeared to accept, as had the trial court, the corporation’s conten-
tion that plaintiffs should “elect someone other than themselves to represent
their interests on the board of directors” as if that were an adequate response to
outright intimidation.75 (Presumably these substitute directors would need to be
more physically imposing.) The court gave no weight to the notion that the
sisters, as substantial shareholders, might have an interest in participating
directly.
Given the serious impediments to plaintiffs’ exercise of their rights as share-
holders, and the specific allegations of self-dealing, the court should have
scrutinized the plaintiffs’ allegations more closely. The majority shareholder
should have been required to provide evidence substantiating the existence of a
legitimate business purpose for maintaining a furniture operation that consis-
tently lost money. The problem was not the substantive standard, but the relaxed
scrutiny applied by the court even though it was clear that the minority
shareholders had no voice.
2. Fiduciary Duty: The Partnership Model
The Fiduciary Duty approach holds that majority shareholders owe a height-
ened fiduciary duty akin to the duty partners owe to each other, restricting even
70. Id. at 315.
71. Id. at 320.
72. Id. at 318. The court was also right to observe that plaintiffs had received regular and substantial
dividends from their share ownership. See id. at 315, 319.
73. Id. at 320 (emphasis added). Indeed, the court discounted plaintiffs’ allegations because “plain-
tiffs removed themselves from participation in the board meetings.” Id.
74. Id. at 315. The court does not describe the specific circumstances of the altercation. However,
whether or not the physical violence was itself connected to the business dispute, the court does
recognize that the fear of violence may have precluded the sisters from further direct involvement with
the business. See id.
75. Id. at 316, 319 (quoting trial court’s findings).
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otherwise legitimate business decisions that harm minority shareholders.76 In
one influential, if vague, formulation, minority shareholders may insist upon
scrupulously “equal treatment.”77 On this approach, the partnership aspects of a
close corporation take precedence: “[t]he stockholders ‘clothe’ their partnership
‘with the benefits peculiar to a corporation, limited liability, perpetuity and the
like.’”78 However, apart from expressing the general sentiment that majority
shareholders should not mistreat minority shareholders, the standard provides
little useful guidance to courts.79
For an enhanced fiduciary standard to have content, we would need some
definite idea of what the fiduciary duty might require, beyond what corporate
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty already require. If the majority must
sometimes put the minority’s interests ahead of its own, or those of the
corporation, the standard is unhelpfully vague, risks empowering minority
shareholders to demand disproportionate benefits from the corporation, and
treats the decision to incorporate a business (or to invest in an incorporated
entity) as inconsequential. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, the approach
thwarts the majority’s ability to manage the business at all.80
76. The idea that closely held corporations are akin to partnerships is not a new one. See, e.g., Miner
v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 53 N.W. 218, 224 (Mich. 1892) (“Corporations of this kind are in truth little more
than private partnerships . . . .” (citing Foss v. Harbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 202 (High Ct. Ch. 1843))).
77. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1975).
78. Id. at 512 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Through the clothing metaphor, the court conveys
its view that the partnership is the essence and the corporate law differences mere trappings. Id. The
“incorporation benefits are clothes” metaphor establishes a relation between the source domain of
“clothing a human being” to the target domain of “incorporating a partnership.” The metaphor carries
over, as one of its entailments, the concept that clothes may enhance or disguise the human form, but
they are accessories and cannot fundamentally change the person underneath. See also O’NEAL &
THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 4, § 2:3 at 2-18 (using a similar metaphor in discussing
“ill-fitting governance norms”).
79. Arguably, the difference is in the application of those duties to the relationships among
shareholders. Some courts adhere to the traditional view that corporate fiduciary duties belong to the
corporation. See, e.g., Schautteet v. Chester State Bank, 707 F. Supp. 885, 888 (E.D. Tex. 1988)
(“Officers and directors owe fiduciary duties only to the corporation.”). The better view is that
controlling shareholders, through control and operation of the board, owe fiduciary duties to the
minority even in a public corporation. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1919)
(“The majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation toward the
minority.”); Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 40 (Del. 1996) (“To be sure, the Majority
Stockholders may well owe fiduciary duties to Nagy as a minority stockholder.”).
80. Moreover, one reason for choosing a corporate rather than partnership form is to guard against
the possibility of rent-seeking tactics by minority shareholders who could otherwise threaten to dissolve
the business or to veto important decisions. See Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close
Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 240–41 (1992) (“[T]he
corporation law preference for majority adaptability combines with the lack of a unilateral minority
withdrawal right to insulate the majority from the threat of minority opportunism.”). While investors
might once have chosen the corporate form in order to obtain the benefits of limited liability, even when
partnership governance norms would otherwise be more desirable, see id. at 241, the newer LLC form
(which permits limited liability and greater investor liquidity) may offer a better set of default rules for
some closely-held firms, see Charles R. O’Kelley, Foreword: Understanding the Place of Limited
Liability Companies in the Spectrum of Business Forms, 73 OR. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994); see also Gevurtz,
supra note 61 at 537 (describing the ability of a majority to amend an operating agreement). The extent
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Massachusetts usefully illustrates the difficulty of applying uncompromising
fiduciary duties when the fiduciaries also directly participate and benefit from
ownership.81 In Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., the Massachusetts Supreme
Court announced that close corporation shareholders “owe one another substan-
tially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe
to one another.”82 The court described the standard as “‘the duty of the finest
loyalty.’”83 Applying that standard, the court concluded that the majority had
violated its fiduciary duties to the minority by refusing to offer a share repur-
chase plan on the same terms as had been offered to an aging majority
shareholder who wished to retire from the business. The unequal treatment was,
according to the court, an abuse of the majority’s power.84
Yet, within a year, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home85 substantially softened the fiduciary duty analysis without
actually repudiating Donahue. Under the revised analysis, courts first ask
whether the majority can offer a reasonable business justification for a chal-
lenged corporate decision.86 If so, then the minority must establish that the
result could have been accomplished in some other manner that would not have
caused harm to the minority shareholder.87 The court recognized that the
majority’s interest in selfish ownership does not, per se, violate a fiduciary duty
owed to the minority.88
to which the common law and statutory responses to minority shareholder oppression in the close
corporation will be applied in the LLC context remains uncertain. See generally Sandra K. Miller et al.,
An Empirical Glimpse into Limited Liability Companies: Assessing the Need To Protect Minority
Investors, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 609, 627–35 (2006).
81. Of course, a similar argument could be made that the extension by analogy of fiduciary duties
from the traditional trustee context to co-venturers in a partnership is itself problematic.
82. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 593.
83. Id. at 516 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.)). In Meinhard,
then-Judge Cardozo defined the concept of fiduciary duty for partners in famously florid prose: “Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties. . . . Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior.” 164 N.E. at 546. Interestingly, the very act of identifying Cardozo’s
rhetorical excess seems to create in commentators an irresistible urge to join the fun. See, e.g., Barbara
Ann Banoff, Company Governance Under Florida’s Limited Liability Company Act, 30 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 53, 59 (2002) (labeling Cardozo’s rhetoric “galloping Meinhardism” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Geoffrey P. Miller, A Glimpse of Society Via a Case and Cardozo: Meinhard v. Salmon, in
THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW, supra note 18, at 12, 23 (“Cardozo, a virtuoso stylist, outdid
himself in Meinhard v. Salmon, serving up a spicy bouillabaisse of metaphor and allusion . . . .”).
84. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
85. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
86. See id. at 663.
87. See id. (“When an asserted business purpose for their action is advanced by the majority,
however, we think it is open to minority stockholders to demonstrate that the same legitimate objective
could have been achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful to the minority’s
interest.”).
88. For a more recent Massachusetts case acknowledging that tension in the context of fashioning an
appropriate remedy, see Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006) (“The remedy . . .
should attempt to reset the proper balance between the majority’s ‘concede[d] . . . rights to what has
been termed selfish ownership,’ . . . and the minority’s reasonable expectations of benefit from its
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The two cases illustrate the difficulty in articulating and applying an en-
hanced partnership-like fiduciary duty in the corporate context. The fiduciary
standard announced in Donahue appeared to prohibit any corporate action,
regardless of its business purpose, unless the benefits were made available to all
shareholders on an equal basis.89 That rule would frustrate the close corpora-
tion’s ability to repurchase shares of retiring members unless the close corpora-
tion had sufficient funds to repurchase all outstanding shares.90 Moreover, it
was unclear how a fiduciary standard of “utmost loyalty” could co-exist with
the corporate governance principle of majority rule without making the acquisi-
tion of control a pointless, if not treacherous, accomplishment.91
The modified Wilkes approach allows Massachusetts courts to consider legiti-
mate corporate purposes, but cannot easily be squared with the notion of a
fiduciary duty that requires more, substantively, of controlling shareholders than
ordinary corporate fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.92 However, from a
procedural perspective, Wilkes does place the onus on controlling shareholders
to show a business purpose, even if a minority shareholder has had a full, fair
opportunity to participate in the business decision and simply disagrees with the
majority’s judgment.93
3. Reasonable Expectations: A Tailored Approach with Uncertain Foundations
Evaluation of minority shareholder “reasonable expectations” constitutes a
shares.” (second ellipsis in original) (citation omitted)). It is unclear why the Brodie court believed that
the majority’s interests deserved attention at the remedy phase but not in determining liability. As to
liability, Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that the majority shareholders
breached their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder by “hindering her ability to sell her shares in
the open market.” Id. This notwithstanding the fact that the majority shareholders “gave the plaintiff
full permission to sell her stock to a third party” and fell short of their fiduciary obligation “by refusing
to perform a valuation of the company” which “prevented the plaintiff from determining the value of
her shares.” Id. at 1080 n.4. The idea that the minority, holding an illiquid investment, could demand
(and reasonably expect) that the corporation perform a valuation exercise at its own expense solely for
the minority’s benefit is astounding.
89. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 516.
90. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 271, 298–99 (1986) (“Most firms could not survive if the purchase of the interest of a retiring
member required that everyone else be given the opportunity to sell out at the same price.”).
91. See id. at 295; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1688 (1990) (“The application of strict fiduciary standards to close corporations
deprives controlling shareholders of the ability to manage the corporation—to use their own prop-
erty—as they see fit.”).
92. See, e.g., Brodie, 857 N.E.2d at 1082, discussed supra note 88.
93. On its facts, it appears there were restrictions of minority voice in Wilkes that warranted
enhanced scrutiny. One of the four equal participants in a nursing home business venture was forced out
by the other shareholders and deprived of his salary. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353
N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976). Applying the reformulated fiduciary duty standard, the Wilkes court
concluded that the majority had “not shown a legitimate business purpose for severing Wilkes from the
payroll of the corporation or for refusing to reelect him as a salaried officer and director.” Id. at 663.
The court relied on the trial court’s finding that Wilkes had not sought to harm the corporation but,
rather, “had always accomplished his assigned share of the duties competently, and that he had never
indicated an unwillingness to continue to do so.” Id. at 664.
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third method of adjudicating shareholder oppression cases.94 Reasonable Expec-
tations analysis recognizes that close corporations have characteristics “that
distinguish them from the typical public corporation.”95 Also, by focusing on
shareholder expectations, the approach can be used to identify different types of
close corporations; for example, shareholder relationships in a family corpora-
tion may be quite different than those in a venture capital-funded start up. When
applying a Reasonable Expectations approach, a court will protect certain
minority interests—sometimes assessed, hypothetically, as what the minority
would have bargained for—thereby limiting the majority’s right of selfish
ownership. The majority, in effect, owes additional duties to the minority; those
duties are defined by an account of what it is reasonable for the minority to
expect from the majority.
Although the approach defines oppression in terms of minority expectations,
it does not necessarily require strong protection of minority shareholders. The
Reasonable Expectations approach depends on the meaning of the word “reason-
able” and, therefore, requires a deeper theory of shareholder rights and obliga-
tions. For example, if minority shareholders are entitled to expect only that the
majority will not act in bad faith to deprive the minority of the value of its
investment, then we have simply replicated the Bad Faith approach.96 A further
interpretive difficulty is that a minority’s objectively reasonable expectation
may vary over time, expanding or contracting based upon decisions in other
shareholder litigations.
Compounding these difficulties, in order to assign a clear meaning to the term
“reasonable,” we must identify the nature of the expectation. To the extent
courts set aside what the parties actually agreed or understood and focus upon
what objectively reasonable parties would have contracted for, Reasonable
Expectations turns on a hypothetical expectation and becomes a fictional device
for courts to adjust the parties’ relationship after the fact. This approach may
well facilitate appropriate resolution of shareholder disputes concerning matters
94. See, e.g., Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 679 (“[C]ourts in at least twenty-one states have
applied the language in some form.”); Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy, supra note 15,
at 853 (identifying minority shareholder expectations as one of “three principal approaches to defining
oppression”). Yet, as Professor Moll observes, defining shareholder oppression in terms of “reasonable
expectations” does little more than “simply rephrase[] the fundamental question.” Moll, Shareholder
Oppression & Dividend Policy, supra note 15, at 844. The “doctrine provides no guidance on whether
an asserted expectation is ‘reasonable,’ and thus enforceable, in the particular circumstances before a
court.” Id.
95. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra note 9, at 717. The Reasonable Expecta-
tions standard “has become an easily accessible label to identify the special nature of close corpora-
tions.” Id. at 716.
96. New York’s measured use of minority shareholder expectations is probably closer to a Bad Faith
approach than a Fiduciary Duty standard and reflects concern that the minority may use litigation as a
coercive tool. See In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984) (“It would be
contrary to [the statute’s] remedial purpose to permit its use by minority shareholders as merely a coercive
tool.” (citations omitted)); In re Dubonnet Scarfs, Inc., 105 A.D.2d 339, 343 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (rejecting
notion that shareholder in close corporation “can demand to be bought out . . . and that if such demand
is not complied with, then such shareholder can seek the dissolution of that corporation”).
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the parties never contemplated, but describing a court’s insertion of new terms
into the parties’ bargain as a matter of “reasonable expectations” disguises what
the court is actually doing.97
If, on the other hand, courts seek to take into account the parties’ actual
understandings, whether at the time of investment or as they may have evolved,
then Reasonable Expectations employs a quasi-contractual analysis to decide
whether alleged expectations should be honored.98 The analysis is not con-
strained by ordinary principles of contract interpretation, however, because the
terms at issue are implicit.99 Thus, Reasonable Expectations analysis relies upon
material too shaky to support an ordinary contract while leaving courts discre-
tion to go beyond mere restitution once liability has been determined.100 While
perhaps less open-ended and paternalistic than hypothetical-bargain analysis,
because there must at least be some evidence of a bargain, this version of
Reasonable Expectations analysis seems to invite protracted and expensive
litigation over contested issues of fact that may be very difficult to prove or
disprove.101 If shares have been passed down from the first generation, through
gift or inheritance, consideration of expectations becomes even more attenuated.
Despite these difficulties, the Reasonable Expectations approach has facili-
tated more careful judicial analysis of close corporations as distinctive entities.
In particular, a focus on shareholder expectations leads naturally to consider-
ation of minority shareholder voice because minority shareholders often expect
97. See, e.g., Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 n.4 (Mass. 2006) (assessing minority
shareholder expectations in context of claim for breach of fiduciary duty and affirming lower court’s
ruling that minority shareholder had reasonable expectation that corporation would not only permit her
to sell her shares to a third party, but would perform a valuation at its expense to facilitate the sale).
98. In North Carolina, for example, “[o]nly expectations embodied in understandings, express or
implied, among the participants should be recognized by the court.” Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983). In New York, courts are to “investigate what the majority shareholders
knew, or should have known to be the petitioner’s expectations in entering the particular enterprise.”
Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d at 1179. This approach makes the fundamental corporate agreement
subject to an after-the-fact judicial determination based upon, inter alia, witness credibility and assumes
that it may have been reasonable for minority shareholders to expect unbargained-for benefits.
99. See F. Hodge O’Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33
BUS. LAW. 873, 886 (1978) (“In a close corporation, the corporation’s charter and bylaws almost never
reflect the full business bargain of the participants.”).
100. See Moll, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 14, at 1073 (defending those features of the
doctrine and stating that “it is fair to assert that oppression law is doing what contract law should be
doing if contract law took a broader perspective when identifying and enforcing bargains.” (emphasis in
original)).
101. At some point, though, the line between analysis of what a minority shareholder would,
hypothetically, have bargained for and what the parties’ actual understanding might have been becomes
hopelessly blurred. See Moll, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 14, at 1012 (“Courts may be willing
to find reasonable expectations based on a broader pattern and thin specific evidence because they
understand the economics behind an investor’s commitment of capital to a close corporation. In other
words, courts seem to appreciate that a rational minority stockholder would not invest in a close
corporation without reaching a shared understanding of continued employment and management
participation with the majority stockholder.”).
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to have a role in the management of the close corporation.102 For example, an
influential early New York trial court decision explained that “[n]ot uncom-
monly a participant in a closely held enterprise invests all his assets . . . with an
expectation, often reasonable under the circumstances . . . that he will be a key
employee in the company and will have a voice in business decisions.”103
New York’s Court of Appeals adopted that reasoning four years later.104 The
court noted the connection between exit and voice: “As the stock of closely held
corporations generally is not readily salable, a minority shareholder at odds with
management policies may be without either a voice in protecting his or her
interests or any reasonable means of withdrawing his or her investment.”105 The
court recognized that share ownership in a close corporation is more than a
financial investment because a “shareholder in a close corporation is a co-owner
of the business and wants the privileges and powers that go with ownership.”106
While we need to know more than what a close corporation shareholder
“wants” in order to assign specific content to “reasonable” expectations, given
the absence of a contractual basis for those expectations, the Kemp & Beatley
court correctly identified voice as an important alternative to exit.
In sum, none of the existing approaches to minority shareholder oppression is
satisfactory. The Bad Faith approach proceeds as if close corporations were
public corporations; the Fiduciary Duty approach assumes that they are, essen-
tially, partnerships. Reasonable Expectations avoids reductive reasoning only to
fall into the trap of circular reasoning: the approach depends upon an external
standard to define what is “reasonable.”
II. THE VALUE OF VOICE
To improve upon existing responses to minority shareholder oppression, we
need a better account of voice in the close corporation. This Part argues that
robust minority shareholder voice is vital to the health of close corporations.
First, corporate decisions based on transparent, open discussion will more often
serve the interests of all shareholders, and the minority will more likely accept
the results of an inclusive, deliberative process as fair. Second, minority share-
holders ought to participate in the management of what will often be their
largest investment.
A. INSTRUMENTAL BENEFITS OF DELIBERATION
The minority’s participation in governance—its voice—enables the minority
102. See, e.g., McCallum v. Rosen’s Diversified, Inc., 153 F.3d 701, 703 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Often-
times, a shareholder’s reasonable expectations include a significant voice in management and an
opportunity to work.” (citation omitted)).
103. See In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (quoting F. Hodge O’Neal, Close
Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS. LAW. 873, 884 (1978)).
104. See In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178–79 (N.Y. 1984).
105. Id. at 1179.
106. Id. at 1178.
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to advance its interests and to be heard on important issues, a process protection
lost when close corporations fail to hold shareholder meetings and lacking when
the minority has no active role in management. Enhanced minority participation
would improve close corporation governance by increasing the range of perspec-
tives brought to bear on any given problem.107
The exercise of voice is, or can be, more than the casting of votes. Indeed, the
mere ability to vote may be of little consequence for a minority shareholder if
the controlling shareholders are in the majority.108 Formal studies indicate that
groups have important cognitive advantages over sole decisionmakers,109 a
finding consistent with arguments at least as old as Aristotle.110 Many heads are
better than one.111 When minority shareholders participate in decisionmaking,
107. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing that a range of perspectives is a cognitive advantage of group
decisionmaking that supports a model of director primacy in corporate decisionmaking). Professor
Bainbridge opposes enhanced shareholder participation in public corporations. See Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006). However,
in close corporations, the cognitive advantages of group decisionmaking he identifies would seem to
support robust minority shareholder participation, especially when there is a single majority share-
holder.
108. See Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, supra note 49, at 8 (“[I]f those in control already have a
majority, voting becomes an empty vessel.”). For a recent exploration of the value of voting in the
corporate context, see Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV.
129 (2009). The authors focus on public corporations, where shareholders typically sell “when they
disagree with a decision made by the corporation’s managers.” Id. at 130. Accordingly, the authors
contend that voting should be viewed not in terms of “democratic theory and legitimacy” but within “a
framework based on information theory, which treats voting as a means of error correction for
decisions.” Id. They observe, correctly, that “[v]oting within close corporations or by controlling
shareholders is the mechanism to implement the property rights that follow from acquiring the
controlling interest,” and so “[t]he likelihood of the correct decision when there is a vote with a
majority shareholder is exactly the likelihood of the majority shareholder alone getting the right
answer; voting does not improve accuracy.” Id. at 151. What follows, however, is not that minority
shareholder participation is useless, but that voice must mean more than voting for it to matter.
109. See, e.g., Gary Charness, Edi Karni & Dan Levin, Individual and Group Decision Making
Under Risk: An Experimental Study of Bayesian Updating and Violations of First-order Stochastic
Dominance, 35 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 129, 129 (2007) (“The violation rate when groups make decisions
is substantially lower, and decreasing with group size, suggesting that social interaction improves the
decision-making process.”).
110. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1281b2, reprinted in THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 1, 123 (Ernest Baker
trans., 1962) (“Feasts to which many contribute may excel those provided at one man’s expense. In the
same way, when there are many who contribute to the process of deliberation each can bring his share
of goodness and moral prudence . . . .”). Aristotle’s argument is an example of the metaphor that ideas
are food. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 46–47 (1980) (arguing that
“metaphors partially structure our everyday concepts and that this structure is reflected in our literal
language” and providing examples: “I just can’t swallow that claim. . . . Now there’s a theory you can
really sink your teeth into. . . . That’s food for thought. . . . We don’t need to spoon-feed our students.
He devoured the book.” (emphases removed)). For a thorough discussion of conceptual metaphor and
law, see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001).
111. Best Buy recently put this principle into practice by establishing a “prediction market” through
which its 115,000 U.S. employees place bets as to whether “a new product or idea is likely to succeed.”
Phred Dvorak, Best Buy Taps “Prediction Market”: Imaginary Stocks Let Workers Forecast Whether
Retailer’s Plans Will Meet Goals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at B1. The collective wisdom of Best
Buy’s employees “has often proved to be more accurate than the company’s official forecasts.” Id.
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the majority may benefit from the presentation of opposing arguments and will
be pressed to defend its own preferences.112 If, for instance, payment of
dividends depends upon the corporation’s expected need for cash in the coming
year, reviewing the corporation’s financial outlook together with minority share-
holders will make it more likely that a reasonable consensus will emerge. If the
corporation does not truly need to retain earnings, controlling shareholders will
find it harder to withhold or reduce dividends.
Conversely, where the majority can articulate an objective basis for its own
view, the minority may disagree but will see that there are countervailing
considerations and will more likely accept the outcome as fair.113 Sometimes, it
is valuable to be heard on an issue, even when ultimate decisionmaking
authority rests elsewhere.114 For example, shareholders in public corporations
have increasingly demanded the ability to cast nonbinding votes concerning
executive compensation.115 Although the board sets compensation, shareholders
want a voice in the process. Among other things, they believe that compensation
committees will act with greater deliberation if their work is subject to en-
Other companies using or experimenting with internal prediction markets include Google Inc., General
Electric Co., Intel Corp. and Microsoft Corp. Id.
112. See RONALD M. MASON, PARTICIPATORY AND WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY: A THEORETICAL DEVELOP-
MENT IN CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 35 (1982) (observing that a crucial first step for effective governance is
the identification of problems and that “[p]articipation is thus an indispensable aid to improve input to
government”). Although the author describes his work as non-liberal, he does not reject, and appears to
accept, the central tenets of liberalism: individual liberty and equality. Id. at 32 (describing liberty and
equality as preconditions for effective participation). Certainly, he does not identify any illiberal
consequences he would be prepared to accept. It would appear more accurate, then, to describe the
work as a criticism of certain conceptions of liberalism and not, as the author posits, a “break from
liberal thought.” Id. at 201.
113. The difference between an opportunity to participate and total exclusion is well illustrated by
the following testimony of a minority shareholder:
My brother had the majority of stock . . . before this management contract. As to whether he
had the final say in the control of [the corporation], that is the point. He might have been the
final say, but when [the new corporation] started, I lost all say-so because he wouldn’t listen to
anybody.
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 555 (N.C. 1983). The connection between voice and
legitimacy is that “participation increase[s] acceptance of decisions.” MASON, supra note 112, at 38
(citing Jean-Jacques Rosseau’s political theory and more contemporary social science research).
114. Indeed, it is important to distinguish between deliberation and ultimate decision power. In
addition to making a correct decision, a corporation must have the ability to decide at all. A deliberative
mechanism that required consensus, whether unanimous or supermajority, would risk deadlock. See
James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A Critique of Deliberative Democracy and the Life of Talk, 63
TENN. L. REV. 421, 430 (1996) (identifying the “commitment to consensus” as “the most problematic
feature of deliberative democracy”). Even assuming scrupulous good faith on the part of all partici-
pants, substantive disagreement is always possible. See id. Giving minority shareholders veto power
would also create a danger of opportunism, where minority shareholders might threaten to hold out in
order to extract a non-pro-rata share of profits.
115. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Say on Pay: A Whisper or a Shout for Shareholders? N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
6, 2008, at Bus. 9 (“Last year, investors filed 60 resolutions asking for a say on pay . . . . This year,
there were more than 90 such resolutions filed . . . .”).
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hanced scrutiny and meaningful, if nonbinding, feedback from shareholders.116
In two foreign jurisdictions, “say on pay” appears to have had an impact on
compensation.117
That deliberation—speech—is desirable and produces better, more legitimate
outcomes than the alternative is a contestable claim but also one that is
fundamental to our representative form of government.118 Advocates of delibera-
tive democracy argue for greater levels of participation and hold that legitimacy
depends upon discussion, not just voting—and that we owe one another rea-
sons.119 On this view, the goal of deliberation is to improve collective understand-
ing and to reach decisions that all can regard as fair.120
The argument that an inclusive deliberation is more legitimate and more
likely to lead to a correct outcome need not be limited to the political realm.121
In Hoschett v. TSI International Software, Ltd.,122 Chancellor Allen cited the
value of deliberation in holding that a corporation’s annual shareholder meeting
is mandatory, even when the majority has enough votes to elect a new slate of
directors on written consent:
116. Id. (“‘Shareholders are recognizing that, when chairmen of compensation committees under-
stand that their decisions will be subject to a vote of confidence, they try harder to get it right.’”
(quoting Stephen M. Davis, project director at the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and
Performance at Yale)).
117. Id. (“In one sense, American investors are coming late to the party. Say-on-pay resolutions have
been common in Britain and Australia for several years, and governance experts say they have most
likely reined in compensation in those countries.”). Of course, public corporation shareholders also
have the ability to exit, which places some weight behind even informal resolutions.
118. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 241 (1993) (stating that the
“American constitutional system” is designed “to ensure discussion and debate among people who are
genuinely different in their perspectives and position, in the interest of creating a process through which
reflection will encourage the emergence of general truths”). The alternative to deliberation is tallying
existing preferences. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 13
(2004) (rejecting aggregative theories, which take preferences as given and seek fair methods of
translating individual preferences into collective judgment, and advocating a deliberative conception of
governance, which assumes that preferences can be reexamined); David M. Estlund, Who’s Afraid of
Deliberative Democracy? On the Strategic/Deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurispru-
dence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1437, 1452 (1993) (“Many people think democratic inputs are mere expression
of preference, not judgments at all.”).
119. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 118, at 4 (“The reasons are meant both to produce a
justifiable decision and to express the value of mutual respect.”). The importance of giving reasons may
depend in part on whether we view the goals of participants as achieving self-interest, defined in terms
of fixed preferences on a rational choice model, or whether we believe that human behavior, viewed
from a political perspective, can escape the reductive power of classical economic reasoning.
120. See id. at 12 (“Through the give-and-take of argument, participants can learn from each other,
come to recognize their individual and collective misapprehensions, and develop new views and
policies that can more successfully withstand critical scrutiny.”).
121. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 118, at 34 (“Corporations are another . . . example of an
institution that should be subject to more deliberation.”); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or
Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 335 (2008) (“Writing on
civic republicanism and on corporate law rarely overlaps, but republican ideas can offer a very useful
perspective on corporate law.”).
122. Hoschett v. TSI Int’l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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The theory of the annual meeting includes the idea that a deliberative compo-
nent of the meeting may occur. Shareholders’ meetings are mandated and
shareholders authorized by statute to transact proper business because we
assume that at such meetings something said may matter. Obviously these
meetings are very far from deliberative convocations, but a keen realization of
the reality of the degree of deliberation that is possible, should make the
preservation of residual mechanisms of corporate democracy more, not less,
important.123
Chancellor Allen observed that “while the model of democratic forms should
not too strictly be applied to the economic institution of a business corporation,”
the shareholders’ meeting facilitates “a form of discourse (i.e., oral reports,
questions and answers and in rare instances proxy contests) among investors
and between shareholders and managers.”124
Some might question the value of voice for locked-in minority shareholders
because majority shareholders ultimately decide all contested questions, but
voice is a political mechanism and need not be synonymous with control. A
person’s ability to participate and to be heard on issues important to a shared
enterprise, whether family, business organization, or nation-state, does not turn
on the final tally of votes.125 Voice is not as crude a mechanism as exit; its value
lies in its nuance, as a means of shaping the goals of a close corporation to
better accommodate the interests of all shareholders.126
Of course, since the majority still controls the outcome, the participants are
not substantively equal, even if there is formal equality of participation.127 In
addition, there will not always be a “right” decision, because the majority and
minority may have different interests, neither one of which impacts the efficient
operation of the business, only the distributive effects.128 Although voice is not
123. Id. at 46.
124. Id. at 45–46. In a closely held corporation with relatively few shareholders, Chancellor Allen’s
vision of a deliberative process is more feasible and more usual.
125. Indeed, the imbalance of power makes participation all the more important if we are to reduce
the frequency of shareholder litigation. Cf. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 118, at 6–7 (noting that
full consensus may be impossible to achieve but that those who “disagreed with the original decision
are more likely to accept it if they believe they have a chance to reverse or modify it in the future”).
126. See MASON, supra note 112, at 39 (“That participation can even transform an individual’s
conceptualization of his interests indicates that participation is a potent agent as well as medium of
socialization. Through participation in any system, support will develop for that system.”).
127. Hoschett, 683 A.2d at 46 (noting that, unlike democracies, “votes are weighted by the size of
the voter’s investment”); Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and Civic
Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1391 (2006) (“By virtue of the one-vote-per-share
principle, larger shareholders inevitably have a greater say in corporate governance than do smaller
shareholders.”). For an exception, where the shareholders had agreed, in effect, that no corporate action
could be taken over the objection of any shareholder, see Smith v. Atlantic Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798,
801–02 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (finding, in an unusual application of shareholder oppression doctrine,
that the minority shareholder had oppressed the majority by using his veto to block the payment of
dividends).
128. In those situations, it may be especially difficult to distinguish opportunistic behavior from the
right of selfish ownership.
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a panacea for the problem of minority shareholder oppression, enhanced partici-
pation will improve close corporation governance overall by fostering a transpar-
ent, cooperative mode of decisionmaking, and so it is reasonable to expect that
close corporations that invite minority participation will, on the whole, be less
likely to behave oppressively toward the minority.129 Because minority voice
serves these ameliorative purposes, and signifies them, we should view its
presence or absence as an important proxy for oppression.130
B. NORMATIVE REASONS FOR PARTICIPATION
In addition to the benefits enhanced minority shareholder voice may offer for
the quality of deliberation and governance in close corporations, minority
shareholders with a substantial stake ought to participate and take responsibility
for the success or failure of the business.131
As a general matter, minority shareholders welcome this responsibility. By
investing in a close corporation, minority shareholders make a deliberate choice
to link their fortune with their own efforts and to exercise control over their
working lives.132 For those shareholders, participating in a close corporation
may represent a fundamental life choice, a commitment to work together with
family or friends to build a business consistent with their values.133 The close
corporation may also be chosen as a vehicle for innovators to bring a new
product or service to market, and it is natural to expect that they will be deeply
invested, emotionally as well as economically.134
129. Cf. ELY, supra note 51, at 80.
130. The value of minority shareholder voice does not depend upon achieving, in every case, a
perfect deliberative process. Indeed, even if we assume cynically that majority shareholders will invite
minority participation only as an empty formality, and not because they take the minority’s views
seriously, minority participation remains important. The formal mechanism may itself operate as a
restraint on the majority’s decision whether to exclude the minority from the benefits of ownership. See
Hoschett, 683 A.2d at 45 (acknowledging that requirement of a meeting could be viewed as “a pointless
exercise” but concluding that “knowing that such an occasion [the shareholders’ meeting] is necessarily
to be faced annually may itself have a marginally beneficial effect on managerial attention and
performance. . . . [I]t provides a certain discipline and an occasion for interaction and participation of a
kind”). Admittedly, as Chancellor Allen points out, the effects will be felt at the margin. For further
discussion of the importance of minority access to information, see infra section III.C.
131. For an analogous argument that corporate law should give greater weight to employee input, in
part to capture the benefits of deliberation, see McDonnell, supra note 121, at 336.
132. See, e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (“[T]he primary
expectations of minority shareholders include an active voice in management of the corporation and
input as an employee.” (citation omitted)).
133. See Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 1099, 1110 (1999) (“[T]he employee may simply derive satisfaction from working in a
business that he himself takes a substantial part in managing.”). Further evidence that the investment is
more than a matter of wealth maximization is that “[h]olding stock in a closely held corporation,
viewed purely as an investment decision, seems almost irrational from an economic perspective. Small
businesses are exceedingly risky enterprises with high failure rates.” Id. at 1109.
134. This is not to suggest that innovators insist upon control. To the contrary, sophisticated financial
investors usually condition their investment on the ability to make decisions and, if necessary, remove
the original developers of the idea. See Jeffrey M. Leavitt, Burned Angels: The Coming Wave of
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A news article entitled “Family Hands off Its Business, and Its Philosophy”
provides an interesting illustration of a closely held business that is, for its
owners, more than an opportunity to make money.135 The third-generation,
self-described liberal owners of a family scrap metal company were reluctant to
hand over the reins of their business to local managers who were politically
conservative and perceived to be less worldly.136 The family views the business
as an important part of the community with a philanthropic mission in addition
to making money.137 So concerned were the owners over the future “soul” of
the business, they have—according to the Times—required their managers to
read Thoreau, Sophocles, and Freud and to attend cultural events, including a
Shakespeare play.138 They have also provided each manager with a subscription
to the Sunday New York Times.139 These are matters of perhaps indirect
relevance to the effective management of a scrap metal company and show that
the goals of shareholders in a close corporation are not always identical to the
profit motive of investors in a public corporation.
Just as the instrumental argument for participation can be framed in terms of
a deliberative conception of democracy, the non-instrumental argument also can
draw upon political theories of participation for support.140 In fact, the shift in
emphasis from the instrumental to the normative roughly tracks the difference
between deliberative democracy and certain strands of civic republican thought.
Contemporary civic republicans, such as Frank Michelman and Cass Sunstein,
have argued for deliberative, inclusive decisionmaking, contending that the
Minority-Shareholder Oppression Claims in Venture Capital Start-up Companies, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
223, 226 (2005) (observing that venture capital firms “will often seek to structure the terms of
investments so as to maximize their control of, and thus reward from, their portfolio companies”).
Nothing in this Article is intended to overturn the basic principle of contractual freedom. However,
some commentators contend that “[i]t is almost impossible to deal adequately with [the] potential for ex
post opportunism by ex ante contracting.” Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1465 (1989). Consequently, “although the purpose of enforcing bargains is to
protect expectations, the full enforcement of bargained-out structural and distributional rules in a
closely held corporation may actually violate fair expectations.” Id. at 1465–66. That is why corporate
law enforces certain mandatory fiduciary duties, even at the risk of interfering with private ordering.
Also, as discussed supra note 16, to the extent minority shareholders are aware of “the difficulty of
predicting and planning for future events and their impact on a business enterprise,” id. at 1465, the
existence of judicial discretion as a mandatory background to the corporate bargain may foster socially
valuable investment that would otherwise not take place.






140. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 n.8 (1988)
(“Some of those who value civic virtue emphasize the improvement of individual character . . . .”).
Sunstein identifies this view with classic republicanism and emphasizes a more modern variant, in
which civic virtue is the willingness to deliberate toward a conception of the public good. Id. at 1544
(“Private-regarding reasons are an insufficient basis for legislation. Political actors must justify their
choices by appealing to a broader public good.”).
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process itself has normative benefits for society—fostering good-faith steps
toward consensus and community—even when the minority view does not
prevail.141 Adopting a more classical view of civic republicanism, we might
further contend that participation is inherently valuable for the participant.142
Someone with a large stake in an enterprise ought to take some responsibility
for that enterprise.143
In addition to improving close corporation governance, a more deliberative
decisionmaking process can be viewed as a way of inculcating the habits and
temperament of an engaged, informed citizenry.144 Empirical research suggests
that participation in one sphere may have spillover benefits in other spheres.145
Although some academics dispute the utility of analogies between corporate
and democratic governance, much of that debate has centered upon the public
corporation.146 By contrast, close corporations serve their members’ varied
interests, not necessarily limited to profit maximization. Also, the owners of a
141. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 118, at 244 (“Most ambitiously, we might hope that a well-
functioning system of free expression will ultimately encourage a degree of public virtue and produce
high levels of participation and genuine deliberation”). See generally Frank Michelman, Law’s Repub-
lic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (arguing that inclusive decisionmaking enhances everyone’s political
freedom); Sunstein, supra note 140, at 1545 (“The requirement of appeal to public-regarding reasons
may make it more likely that public-regarding legislation will actually be enacted.”).
142. See McDonnell, supra note 121, at 347 (arguing in favor of employee participation in
governance on the ground that “active involvement in affairs that affect one’s life have a bearing on
one’s personal happiness and sense of well-being”).
143. This notion can be traced to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, defining morality in terms of the virtuous
characteristics of the actor more than the consequences of his actions or the moral precepts obeyed. See
ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, bk. II, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE 306, 334 (Renford Bambrough ed.,
J.L. Creed & A.E. Wardman trans., 2003) (“The virtues, then, are neither innate nor contrary to nature.
They come to be because we are fitted by nature to receive them; but we perfect them by training or
habit.”).
144. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 118, at 35 (“Because most citizens live most of their
lives in civil society outside of conventional politics, deliberative theories seek to structure civil society
so as to better equip citizens to deliberate in politics.”). Indeed, “[w]ithout a civil society that provides
rehearsal space for political deliberation, citizens are less likely to be politically effective.” Id.; see also
MASON, supra note 112, at 79 (contending that an “individual’s involvement in organized social
activities” is a “crucial cause[] of political participation”); MASON, supra note 112, at 187 (“[P]articipa-
tion in the workplace most clearly approximates participation in government.”).
145. See McDonnell, supra note 121, at 370 (reviewing literature and concluding that a majority of
researchers “have found a positive correlation between workplace participation and political participa-
tion”); Stephen C. Smith, Political Behavior as an Economic Externality, in 1 ADVANCES IN THE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATORY AND LABOR-MANAGED FIRMS: A RESEARCH ANNUAL 123 (Derek C.
Jones & Jan Svejnar eds., 1985) (reviewing survey results finding a strong correlation between
decisionmaking participation within the firm and community). Of course, as Professor McDonnell
acknowledges, more would be needed to demonstrate a causal relationship. McDonnell, supra note 121,
at 370.
146. See Rodrigues, supra note 127 (reviewing and critiquing scholarship); Alan R. Palmiter, Public
Corporation as Private Constitution (Wake Forest Legal Studies, Research Paper Series 2, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract1111773 (“My thesis is that our notions of republican
government (and its democratic ideals and practices) inform our notions of corporate governance. And
thus to understand the modern public corporation—and to set its agenda—compels us to understand
and dissect its republican impetus.”).
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close corporation manage their business without significant mediation.147 Fi-
nally, just as in a nation-state, the possibility of exit is radically limited, which
means that differences must be addressed and resolved within the context of a
continuing enterprise.148
The point is not that any particular set of political norms should be adopted
across the government/corporate divide, nor that the purposes of a political
community and a profit-oriented corporation are fundamentally similar. Rather,
the suggestion is that self-governance itself is a shared concept and that more
robust, inclusive governance in the corporate context could have side-benefits
for the public realm.149 Because these normative benefits are externalities, we
would not expect their value to be reflected in the choice of governance
structure. Thus, even if one believed that the market would already supply
inclusive governance, if it were efficient, non-market rationales would also
support a system of judicial scrutiny calculated to enhance the use of voice.150
Political theories that advocate greater deliberation in the public sphere face a
number of serious objections, but those objections do not counsel against this
Article’s proposed enhancement of voice in the close corporation. Take as
emblematic the following critique:
[W]hat is missing from the republican revival is an appreciation of the
frightening power of man to subvert the offices of government . . . . It is this
gap that deprives pure republicanism of any prospect of serving as a viable
constitutional theory. Thus, my argument is not that Sunstein’s aspirational
appeal to civic virtue is always wrong; my claim is only that it is not always
147. See Sunstein, supra note 140, at 1556 (“[R]epublican systems should be small and decentral-
ized. A large republic threatens to diminish the connection between rules and ruled and decrease
opportunities for participation.”); cf. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 118, at 8 (noting that delibera-
tive theories “can be traced to fifth-century Athens” and that “the Athenian democracy of Pericles and
Aristotle was quite different from ours”).
148. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 17 (“In a whole gamut of human institutions, from the state to
the family, voice, however ‘cumbrous,’ is all their members normally have to work with.”).
149. Much commentary concerning corporations, especially large public corporations, has assumed
that their impact on democratic society is, if anything, pernicious. See, e.g., RALPH NADER, CUTTING
CORPORATE WELFARE (2000). The argument that close corporation governance can support democracy,
then, would represent a cheerful counter-tendency. Further work would be required to specify the ways
that close corporation (or other small business) participation may impact matters of public governance.
In this regard, one interesting question would be the extent to which small-scale businesses operate in
closed societies and whether modest economic reforms that enable localized capitalism may have
larger, unintended consequences for those societies.
150. In any case, because the process of incorporating a small business with family and close friends
may depart substantially from the model of economic rationality, it is not clear what weight economic
analysis of the choice of governance terms should be given. Venture capital investors bargain for
exactly what they want (at least as to matters that can be anticipated), but this only highlights the
disparity between what sophisticated parties would negotiate at arms length and what close corporation
shareholders may leave to trust.
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right. And constitutional rules become most important when compassion and
civic virtue are on the wane, not when they are on the rise.151
Even if deliberation is imperfect, an overall increase in “civic virtue” in the
close corporation context would be an unmitigated good. Improved governance
need not eliminate the problem of minority shareholder oppression to be
worthwhile; courts would retain the ability to remedy abuses when they arise.
Thus, minority shareholder voice has value, for reasons both pragmatic and
moral. As discussed in the next Part, courts should vary the degree of scrutiny
they apply to claims of oppression based on the presence or absence of minority
voice. Through varied scrutiny, courts would better account for minority voice
and would create incentives for more inclusive governance models.
III. VARIABLE SCRUTINY BASED UPON MINORITY SHAREHOLDER VOICE
As a practical matter, substantive doctrines tend to entail corresponding
commitments to a level of judicial scrutiny. None of the existing approaches to
minority shareholder oppression has recognized that the level of scrutiny might
be independent of the substantive standard applied.152 An injection of flexibility
would remedy deficiencies of the Bad Faith or Fiduciary Duty approaches
because close corporations resemble corporations and partnerships to varying
degrees, with different consequences for shareholder relationships. By provid-
ing a relatively clear basis for courts to apply relaxed or intensified review, the
proposed model uses minority shareholder voice to avoid the rigidity of current
doctrine without sacrificing rigor or predictability.153
Section III.A explains why scrutiny matters. Section III.B describes the
151. Jonathan R. Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1673, 1673
(1988). In a similar vein, see Russel Hardin, Deliberation: Method, not Theory, in DELIBERATIVE
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 103, 117 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999) (“Delibera-
tion is . . . a method for discovery and, sometimes but not always, a method for mollifying losers by
giving them the sense of at least being heard. These are good things, but they fall far short of being a
general theory of democratic politics.”).
152. Nor have commentators assessed different possible levels of scrutiny. Commentators have
observed merely that any doctrine of minority shareholder oppression involves enhanced judicial
review, requiring something more than a possible business justification for challenged majority conduct.
See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 90, at 293 (noting that “[i]t makes sense . . . to have greater
judicial review of terminations of managerial (or investing) employees in closely held corporations than
would be consistent with the business judgment rule” and that “[t]he same approach could be used with
salary, dividend, and employment decisions”). The business judgment rule, as applied in public
corporations under ordinary circumstances, amounts to almost no judicial review. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 100 (2004)
(“[A] rational business purpose requires only the possibility that the decision was actuated by a
legitimate business reason . . . .” (emphasis added)).
153. A truly ad hoc approach would invite arbitrary decisions that fail to guide future litigants and
create economic uncertainty. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation 5 (Illinois Law and
Economics Research Paper No. LE07-026, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id1003790 (arguing that, among other things, non-contractual fiduciary standards have
driven investors to more predictable entity forms like the LLC).
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proposed model, including possible methods for assessing voice and for using
that assessment to set an appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. Section III.C
contends that varied scrutiny along the lines recommended herein offers impor-
tant advantages over existing approaches. Section III.D briefly addresses two
possible responses: (1) if voice is so important, we should require it; and,
conversely, (2) rather than finding ways to enhance voice, we should create a
more robust right of exit.
A. SUBSTANCE OR SCRUTINY: REEVALUATING THE DOCTRINAL APPROACHES
Some commentators contend that the apparent differences in substantive
doctrine are overstated and that most decisions would be identical, regardless of
the approach.154 One might even question the extent to which shareholder
oppression doctrine imposes different substantive standards than those appli-
cable to controlling shareholders in a public corporation.155 The law, after all,
already provides certain core protections to minority shareholders in both public
and close corporations, including the prohibition of non-pro-rata distributions,
waste, and the taking of corporate opportunities.156 Officers and directors owe
the corporation and its shareholders fiduciary duties of care and loyalty; when
154. For identification of a number of proponents of that view, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 823
(contending that, on the facts, the result in Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993), where
Delaware’s Supreme Court refused to extend “special” protections to minority shareholders, would
have been identical under Massachusetts’ fiduciary duty approach as articulated in Wilkes); O’NEAL &
THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 4, § 9.29, at 9-132–33; O’NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION,
supra note 8, § 7:13, at 7-80; Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the
Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 322 (1990) (“Although courts focusing on the
majority’s duty of utmost good faith and loyalty and courts focusing on the minority’s reasonable
expectations do take different approaches, in practice, there is little difference.”); Moll, The Unan-
swered Question, supra note 42, at 753 n.14; see also Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1019
(App. Div. 1984) (asserting that different approaches to oppression “will frequently be found to be
equivalent”). But see Siegel, supra note 1, at 382–83 (“disabusing any notion that the majority and
minority rules are coalescing”).
155. To some extent, any definition of oppression will limit the majority shareholders’ right of
selfish ownership, which remains the background norm in public corporations. See BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 22, at 336 (stating that “shareholders qua shareholders are allowed to act selfishly in deciding how
to vote their shares”). However, even in public corporations, shareholder directors have fiduciary duties
to other shareholders, and, to the extent that they control the board, controlling groups of shareholders
also owe fiduciary duties. Id.; see also Gatz v. Ponsoldt, 925 A.2d 1265, 1281 (Del. 2007) (en banc)
(permitting direct action by public shareholders where controlling shareholder allegedly violated
fiduciary duty by arranging scheme to take personal profit through recapitalization of company and
dilution of ownership interest of other shareholders).
156. Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator of Self Governance, 34 GA.
L. REV. 529, 535 (2000) [hereinafter Rock & Wachter, Corporate Law] (“[T]he corporate form handles
potential opportunism by the controlling shareholders toward the non-controlling shareholders. Here
the critical mechanism is the prohibition on non-pro-rata distributions.”); Rock & Wachter, Waiting For
the Omelet To Set, supra note 6, at 922 (“So long as the majority shareholders cannot prefer themselves
in distributions, minority shareholders can depend on the majority to protect [their] interests.”). The
duty of loyalty rules extend further “to prevent enough instances of self-dealing from slipping through
so that the overall incentive compatibility of the form is preserved.” Rock & Wachter, Corporate Law,
supra at 536.
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majority shareholders act as officers and directors, they assume certain fiduciary
obligations in those capacities, which can be understood as an assumption of
ordinary, pre-existing corporate responsibilities.157
Of course, even if substantive standards do overlap to a considerable degree,
with each other and with corporation law generally, we still need to have a
method for resolving hard cases.158 In addition, the difference between jurisdic-
tions may be greater than those commentators have recognized because substan-
tive doctrines are translated into substantial divergences concerning the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.
Consider, for example, the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court in Zidell v.
Zidell.159 One commentator cites the case as a clear example of what he terms
the “pure majority perspective.”160 Zidell concerned a passive minority share-
holder investor who complained that dividends were “unreasonably small” and
that the controlling shareholders were taking a disproportionate share of the
wealth through salary and bonuses.161 The court affirmed the award of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, stating that “[i]f there are plausible business
reasons supportive of the decision of the board of directors, and such reasons
can be given credence, a Court will not interfere with a corporate board’s right
to make that decision.”162
While Zidell stands as an example of an approach that “concerns itself solely
with the propriety of the majority’s conduct,”163 it also illustrates the impor-
tance of the degree of scrutiny applied by a court. On the bare allegations—
sharply reduced dividends, increased salary, and bonuses—there are grounds to
suspect that the majority was acting deliberately to increase its wealth at the
expense of the minority. The plaintiff, moreover, had “shown that the corpora-
tions could afford to pay additional dividends” and that there was “hostility”
among the shareholders.164 The court’s apparent willingness to accept “plau-
sible business reasons” followed from its allocation of the burden of proof to the
minority and its insistence on strong evidence of wrongdoing.165
Accordingly, even though the court “recognized that those in control of
corporate affairs have fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing toward the
minority shareholders,”166 the court was, as a practical matter, unwilling to look
157. See, e.g., Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 53 N.W. 218, 223 (Mich. 1892) (“When a number of
stockholders combine to constitute themselves a majority in order to control the corporation as they see
fit, they become, for all practical purposes, the corporation itself, and assume the trust relation occupied
by the corporation toward its stockholders.”).
158. See Moll, The Unanswered Question, supra note 42, at 753.
159. Zidell v. Zidell, 560 P.2d 1086 (Or. 1977).
160. Moll, The Unanswered Question, supra note 42, at 766.
161. Zidell, 560 P.2d at 1088.
162. Id. at 1089.
163. Moll, The Unanswered Question, supra note 42, at 766.
164. Zidell, 560 P.2d at 1089.
165. Id. (“Plaintiff had the burden of proving bad faith . . . .”).
166. Id. (citation omitted).
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behind the majority’s explanation and to scrutinize the compensation and
dividend decisions with care. To understand the court’s decision, the important
point is not the existence of a fiduciary duty imposed on the majority but the
relaxed scrutiny of the majority conduct at issue. To prevail, the minority
shareholder would have had to establish “fraud, bad faith or an abuse of
discretion,” given the court’s insistence that “the burden . . . rests on the party
seeking judicial mandatory relief respecting the declaration of dividends.”167
To be sure, not every shareholder oppression case turns on the question of
scrutiny. However, broadly speaking, doctrinal differences from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction reflect differences in procedure as well as substance. For example, if
the Zidell case arose in Massachusetts, the burden of proof would have been
reversed, and the majority would have had to provide an adequate business
justification for the apparent disparity in compensation.168 Massachusetts has
adopted a substantive doctrine of enhanced fiduciary duty, but that duty is put
into place and made a reality through a procedural mechanism of shifting
presumptions requiring the controlling shareholders in the first instance to show
a legitimate business purpose.169
B. TOWARD A VOICE-CENTERED MODEL OF SCRUTINY
This section addresses two matters necessary for a voice-based framework:
(1) a process for identifying minority shareholder voice; and (2) sufficiently
defined levels of scrutiny corresponding to voice. As the word “toward” in the
heading indicates, this section does not offer conclusive answers to these
questions because the specific implementation would vary depending upon the
existing approach in each jurisdiction.170 However, it is possible to identify
important parameters.
1. Identifying Minority Shareholder Voice
Under the proposed model, minority participation in close corporation gover-
167. Id. (quoting Bates Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, 156 A. 293, 298 (Me. 1931)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
168. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
169. See id. This Article’s focus on levels of scrutiny rather than substantive standards for liability
should not be seen as an attempt to replace one with the other. In order for a court to apply a procedural
standard—for example, enhanced or relaxed scrutiny—the court must also have a substantive doctrine
to apply. In most jurisdictions, as Zidell and Wilkes illustrate, courts consider whether the majority has a
legitimate business purpose consistent with its fiduciary obligation to the corporation and to non-
controlling shareholders. Zidell, 560 P.2d at 1089; Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. Courts to a greater or
lesser degree also take into account any direct harm suffered by the minority. This Article does not take
a position concerning whether harm to minority shareholders should itself trigger liability, except that a
total deprivation of value should be actionable absent extremely compelling circumstances. See, e.g.,
Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 520 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (stating, with regard to
shareholder fired for sexual harassment, that “[a]lthough [his] conduct did warrant some penalty with
respect to his presence and participation in management . . . any penalty should not have extended to
his realization of a fair return on his equity in the company”).
170. See infra Part IV.
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nance determines the level of judicial scrutiny and is, accordingly, the threshold
issue a court would address.171 First, courts would consider whether the chal-
lenged majority action has itself obstructed the minority’s voice, depriving the
minority of access to information and an opportunity to participate in gover-
nance discussions. If so, the court would apply enhanced scrutiny placing the
burden of justification on the majority.
For example, if the majority removed a minority shareholder from the board
of directors, the majority’s conduct would warrant higher-level scrutiny in a
lawsuit challenging the majority’s conduct. The question would be closer if the
minority sought to participate to a greater extent than it had previously—a
situation where it might be said that there is no “reasonable expectation” of
active participation.172 However, any substantial limitation imposed upon the
minority’s participation should be reviewed to ensure the existence of a legiti-
mate business purpose.173
Second, even if the challenged conduct is itself participation-neutral, the
court should assess whether the minority has a substantial right of participation
overall, formally or informally. Factors would include board representation and
whether the corporation holds annual shareholder meetings, keeps adequate
books and records, and otherwise observes corporate formalities.174 Decisions
made by majority shareholders should be treated with more deference if the
minority has had a substantial ability to participate.175
Most states provide shareholders opportunities for voice, including a right to
171. To the extent there are disputed issues of fact, the court would consider testimony and other
evidence gathered during discovery. Few shareholder disputes can be resolved on the pleadings, and so
judicial analysis will usually be in the context of motions for summary judgment.
172. So long as the corporation continues to hold shareholder meetings and follow other formalities,
a minority shareholder who chose to resign voluntarily before filing suit should not be heard to
complain that her voice in the business has been reduced.
173. The minority’s involvement as an employee may be of importance, in terms of the minority’s
ability to earn a return on the investment, but is less likely to implicate issues of voice. As agents of the
business, employees have no assigned role in management or governance.
174. Board representation will often be of particular importance but does not guarantee the effective-
ness of minority voice. See, e.g., Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 382 (Tex. App. 1988) (affirming
finding of oppression where minority shareholder was a director and officer of the corporation but was
deliberately excluded from decisionmaking and where minutes of board meeting stated that his
“‘opinions or actions would have no effect on the Board’s deliberation’”). This Article does not attempt
to identify the degree of access and participation necessary for adequate minority shareholder voice, in
part because a precise definition would be more subject to manipulation and in part because close
corporation governance is often informal, making it difficult to identify specific requirements.
175. While the minority should have a voice in close corporation management, it is not entitled to
control the business. Also, in some cases, relaxed scrutiny may be applied if the minority shareholder
did not take an active role in governance, so long as the opportunity was available. A minority
shareholder should not benefit from a refusal to assume responsibilities for managing a business. See,
e.g., Allchin v. Chemic, Inc., No. 14-01-00433-CV, 2002 WL 1608616, at *9 (Tex. App. 2002) (“An
employee who voluntarily leaves the employment of the corporation presents a less persuasive case for
concluding the majority shareholders oppressed him.” (citations omitted)); Joseph Edward Olson, A
Statutory Elixir for the Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REV. 627, 657 (1985) (“If the complaining
shareholder has himself caused the frustration of his reasonable expectations, the court may deny relief
altogether or limit the remedy accordingly.”).
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be heard at annual shareholder meetings and the right to vote concerning certain
fundamental matters. However, the board of directors and the officers of public
corporations make the vast majority of decisions without shareholder input.176
In a close corporation, by contrast, shareholders typically serve as the directors
and officers of the corporation,177 and shareholders often share bonds of friend-
ship, family, or other personal connection. As a practical matter, so long as the
participants operate in good faith, it is much easier for any shareholder to be
heard, at least informally.178
Close corporations also may adopt additional governance mechanisms de-
signed to enhance minority voice. For instance, a group of founding sharehold-
ers may follow a governance model based on consensus and may agree to
formal mechanisms, such as supermajority voting or guaranteed minority repre-
sentation on the board of directors. Although shareholder agreements allocating
control were once treated with suspicion by courts, wary of undue limitations on
the power of the board of directors,179 such agreements are now widely ac-
cepted.180
Indeed, courts should take account of any shareholder agreements regarding
minority shareholder participation rights. The elevated importance of minority
voice represents a default position, which the parties are free to modify contrac-
tually, subject only to the usual objections to enforcement of a contract and to
limitations on the ability of the shareholders to eliminate fiduciary duties.181 By
agreement, shareholders might explicitly provide for minority shareholder board
representation, or, conversely, they might state that a minority shareholder
intends to make a passive investment.182 However, an agreement regarding the
allocation of control does not itself specify an understanding concerning fidu-
176. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 242 (“[T]he business judgment rule says that courts must
defer to the board of director’s judgment absent highly unusual exceptions.”).
177. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 4, § 1:9, at 1-35.
178. See, e.g., Nelson v. Anderson, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 763 n.8 (Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting minority
shareholder’s claims, in part, because “[a] minority shareholder has a wide range of statutory rights to
help her participate in the management of the corporation,” and “[t]here was no allegation made . . .
that [the shareholder] attempted to avail herself of any of them”). The court observed, to the contrary,
that the plaintiff’s “habit in corresponding with [the majority shareholder] was to be ‘polite’ and ‘nicer’
by reporting only positive opinions about the progress of the marketing effort.” Id.
179. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 806; Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra
note 9, at 703 (“Traditionally . . . . [i]f minority shareholders attempted to contract for protection
against [oppression], such as by agreements that the minority shareholder would retain a corporate
office and a salary, courts . . . struck down the agreement as an unlawful interference with the unfettered
discretion required for directors.”).
180. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 810. The freedom to bargain away from the default rules of
corporate law remains subject to significant limitations; under the Model Act, for instance, shareholder
agreements must be unanimous, limited to ten years, and noted in the stock certificates, so that any
stock purchaser who is not informed of the agreement is entitled to rescission. Id.
181. See id.
182. A lawyer advising a passive investor should insist upon inclusion of provisions guaranteeing
some kind of liquidity, preferably through a buy-sell arrangement, but possibly through mandatory
distributions. Where different roles are anticipated from the outset, such bargaining is more likely to
occur. See Gevurtz, supra note 61, at 510. Thus, “[t]he typical squeeze-out occurs after some ownership
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ciary obligations.
In Meiselman v. Meiselman,183 North Carolina’s Supreme Court addressed
disputed issues of minority shareholder participation in a fashion consistent
with this Article’s recommended approach.184 The case concerned an action for
dissolution brought pursuant to a statute authorizing trial courts “to order
dissolution or another more appropriate remedy when ‘reasonably necessary’
for the protection of the ‘rights or interests’ of the complaining shareholder.”185
Assessing the relationship of the plaintiff and defendant, who were brothers,
the court noted a sharp disagreement about the nature of the plaintiff’s participa-
tion in the business. According to the defendant, the plaintiff “‘was never
denied participation in the management of the corporate defendants,’ that, on
the contrary, [he] ‘voluntarily limited his participation in their affairs.’”186 The
plaintiff countered “that ‘theaters are being sold without my knowledge and
theaters are being built without my knowledge’; and that ‘my brother solely and
without my consent, not only develops but closes, sells, does anything he wants
with all of the properties.’”187
To resolve the matter, the court examined the evidence in the record and
found that it was apparent that the plaintiff’s ability to participate had been
substantially reduced, if not entirely eliminated.188 The court noted that, based
on family arguments—one concerning a girlfriend from a different religion, the
other over an invitation to a football game—the defendant claimed his brother
suffered “from crippling mental disorders.”189 The court also gave weight to a
pre-litigation letter from defendant’s lawyer discouraging plaintiff’s efforts to
secure board representation:
We have no desire to see the productive efforts of the boards be affected by
possibly allowing them to function as a forum for airing personal hurts and
slights; and we all recognize that the course of business activity for the
companies is not going to be altered by [plaintiff]’s representation.190
interests, which started as active, become passive—perhaps . . . involuntarily at the behest of the
majority . . . or often because of changing life circumstances . . . .” Id.
183. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
184. In other respects, the court’s expectations-based approach differs significantly from this Arti-
cle’s recommended framework, because the court held that shareholder participation is significant only
if there is an actual expectation of participation and, equally important, treated that expectation (once
established) as an absolute entitlement. For criticism of those aspects of the decision, see supra notes
177–81 and accompanying text.
185. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 553 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (currently located at
§ 55-14-30(2)(ii))). Notably, and significant to the court’s analysis, the North Carolina dissolution
statute does not appear to require a finding of oppression or other majority misconduct.
186. Id. at 555 (quoting testimony).
187. Id. (quoting testimony).
188. Id. at 555–56.
189. Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Id. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Counsel could hardly have made it clearer that there would be no meaningful
opportunity for plaintiff to participate in governance, despite plaintiff’s nearly
one-third ownership of the businesses at issue. Finally, the court observed that
defendant’s contention that “two corporate decisions were made or changed on
the basis of objections [plaintiff] had lodged” was at best misleading—the
defendant’s primary response to one of those objections was to terminate
plaintiff’s employment.191
The court’s analysis of the participation issue in Meiselman shows that courts
are capable of identifying the presence or absence of minority shareholder
participation, even when the issue is disputed. In some cases, it may be more
difficult to assess the nature of minority participation; in others, it may be easier.
Undoubtedly, there will be close cases. The point is simply that this is the kind
of factual analysis courts are well equipped to make.
2. Setting an Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
A court’s next task, once it has assessed the minority’s voice in the corpora-
tion, is to decide how closely to scrutinize the legitimacy of the challenged
corporate activity. The most straightforward approach is binary: if the minority
shareholder lacks voice, the court applies elevated scrutiny; otherwise, the court
applies relaxed scrutiny. Procedurally, scrutiny could be adjusted through alloca-
tion of the burden of proof.192 For example, borrowing the Wilkes test from
Massachusetts,193 courts might hold that the usual version of that test (which
requires the majority to first demonstrate the legitimacy of the challenged
conduct) applies whenever the minority lacks voice. If the minority has substan-
tial voice, then a reverse-Wilkes test applies instead, and the minority has the
burden of demonstrating that the majority’s conduct was not legitimate.194
The burden could be imposed at the pleading stage—to allege specific facts
supporting a finding that the majority acted without legitimate business purpose—
191. Id. at 556.
192. For purposes of this discussion, we need not make fine-grained distinctions between burdens of
proof, production, and persuasion.
193. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
194. This Article’s proposed framework bears some similarity to a recommendation made by a Law
Commission charged with recommending changes to the English unfair prejudice remedy (an equiva-
lent of U.S. shareholder oppression doctrine). The Law Commission proposed, among other things, a
presumption that “‘where a shareholder has been excluded from participation in the management of the
company, the conduct will be presumed to be unfairly prejudicial by reason of the exclusion’” with a
court ordered buy-out to follow unless the majority rebuts the presumption. See A.J. BOYLE, MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS’ REMEDIES 122–23 (2002) (quoting Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law
Commission Report No. 246, Cm 3769, Stationery Office, 1997), Part 3). The proposal was later
rejected by the Company Law Review Steering Group and has never been adopted. Id. at 126. Notably,
the Law Commission’s presumption of unfair prejudice would appear to go significantly beyond this
Article’s more modest suggestion that heightened scrutiny is warranted when the minority shareholders
lack voice. Under the voice-based framework proposed here, the majority might be required to supply
reasons, but the court would not apply any additional presumption that those reasons are false. To the
contrary, the operating presumption under any level of scrutiny should be that controlling shareholders
have a right to operate the business as they see fit.
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or, at the close of discovery, to be able to identify evidence that sustains an issue
of fact. It is also possible that differences in the level of scrutiny might impact
whether a claim of shareholder oppression would be considered ripe for adjudi-
cation at the pleading stage, at summary judgment, or whether a full airing of
the evidence at trial would be required.195
However, binary analysis would put pressure on the determination of voice
and, in close cases, could lead to unpredictable results. Therefore, even if courts
used a binary method, rather than defining voice and scrutiny along a range of
possibilities, it would be important to remain sensitive in the application of the
standard to actual differences in voice. As an alternative, a court might apply
scrutiny on a sliding scale from minimal to enhanced depending on the quality
of minority shareholder voice.196 Ultimately, the specific method for setting the
level of scrutiny would likely depend on existing doctrine in each state. As
discussed infra Part IV, a voice-based framework can be applied in the context
of any of the three major doctrinal approaches to adjudicating shareholder
oppression claims.
A recent decision from the Oregon Court of Appeals offers an illustration of
what elevated scrutiny might look like in a case where the minority sharehold-
ers lacked voice.197 The decision, issued after a bench trial, contains an exten-
sive review of the evidence relating to the minority shareholder’s allegations,
inter alia, of unfairness in corporate bonus policy.198 The court did not simply
defer to the majority, which, as the court noted, had denied the minority the
opportunity to participate in the management of the business.199
Yet, after careful review of the corporation’s dividend policy, detailing each
year’s bonus for each shareholder and the business justifications offered by the
controlling shareholder, the court concluded that there was a substantial, well-
documented business justification for each bonus:
[D]efendant’s determination of each shareholder’s contribution and effort was
not entirely subjective or arbitrary. Defendant based his determinations primar-
ily on an objective measure: the profits generated by the construction projects
that each shareholder had managed. It is true that defendant made some
adjustments to the objective figures on a subjective basis. However, those
195. Obviously, the uncertainty and expense of trial would create strong incentives to settle.
196. Such an approach would be consistent with this Article’s recommended approach, but the
greater procedural complexity of a sliding scale might create difficulties in application that would
outweigh any greater precision it might offer in theory over a simpler, binary division. Also, it would
represent a further departure from current doctrinal approaches.
197. See Davis v. Brockamp & Jaeger, Inc., 174 P.3d 607, 617 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (“The record
indicates that, with respect to many decisions, defendant merely informed the minority shareholders
after having made the decisions.”). The court found that denial of participation was not, in itself,
oppressive: “Unless a corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws (or some other agreement)
specifically give minority shareholders the right to participate in such decisions—which they did not in
this case—that right does not exist.” Id. at 618.
198. See id. at 610–12.
199. Id. at 617–18.
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adjustments accounted for only a small fraction of the total bonuses. Further-
more, in at least one year, defendant’s subjective adjustments included a
downward adjustment to his own “contribution and effort” figure, which he
made in order to boost the bonuses for [two minority shareholders]. That fact
belies plaintiff’s assertion that defendant’s bonus determinations were moti-
vated by greed.200
The court’s analysis constitutes elevated scrutiny—requiring that the majority
offer business reasons for its conduct and undertaking a searching review of
those reasons—and also underscores the point that the minority shareholder
may still lose.201
C. ADVANTAGES OF A VOICE-CENTERED MODEL FOR ADJUDICATION
In addition to the benefits of deliberation for close corporation governance,
discussed supra Part II, the voice-based framework would improve the quality
of judicial analysis and the efficiency of litigation. Attention to voice encour-
ages flexible application of existing standards and provides a better descriptive
account of what courts have already recognized to be a fact-intensive analysis.
A more flexible standard for judicial scrutiny would also improve the efficiency
of shareholder litigation because it would reserve higher scrutiny for corpora-
tions in which the minority has less ability to protect its own interests and
would allocate pleading or evidentiary burdens to better reflect the parties’
access to information.
1. Avoiding Rigid Application of Existing Standards
The voice-centered model offers a formal methodology to help guide the
case-specific analysis many courts and commentators have recognized is crucial
in close corporation shareholder disputes. By varying the intensity of judicial
review based on minority voice, courts can protect minority shareholder inter-
ests without undermining majority rule.202 Applied without nuance, any of the
existing doctrines for resolving shareholder litigation can lead to the formalistic
protection of either majority or minority shareholder interests. The danger is
perhaps greater for the Bad Faith and Fiduciary Duty approaches, which tend to
200. Id. at 616.
201. Enhanced scrutiny, then, is not the same thing as strict scrutiny in Constitutional law, a standard
reserved for laws that discriminate based upon race or national origin and that is almost never met. See
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing
standard as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in
Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006)
(questioning the conventional wisdom concerning strict scrutiny).
202. As a kind of representation-reinforcement, the voice-based approach is very loosely analogous
to John Hart Ely’s famous, process-oriented approach to constitutional adjudication and the counterma-
joritarian difficulty. See ELY, supra note 51, at 87 (arguing that the Constitution “ensur[es] broad
participation in the processes and distributions of government”).
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align with public corporation or partnership models of the close corporation, but
overly rigid analysis can also be found in jurisdictions that use Reasonable
Expectations analysis.
For example, when North Carolina’s Supreme Court adopted a version of the
Reasonable Expectations approach and emphasized the significance of a minor-
ity shareholder’s “meaningful participation” in management, it appeared to
reject wholesale the basic norms of corporation law.203 The court cited exten-
sive scholarly authority for the proposition that close corporations are “little
more than ‘incorporated partnerships’”204 and stated, “when courts apply the
principle of majority rule in close corporations, they often disappoint the
reasonable expectations of the participants.”205
In effect, the court held that the decisions of the controlling shareholders, as
well as their judgment concerning the best course of action for the business,
deserved no weight. The trial court’s finding—that there was “no evidence to
support a finding of fact that there was oppression, overreaching on the part of
management, the taking of any unfair advantage of the minority stockholder by
the majority stockholder or any other wrongful conduct on the part of the
majority stockholder”—was, accordingly, irrelevant.206 On remand, the trial
court was instructed to consider only what the “rights or interests” of the
minority shareholder might be and whether they “are in need of protection.”207
It is possible to recognize the importance of minority shareholder voice, as
the Meiselman court did, without excluding from the analysis the business
legitimacy of the decisions at issue. The choice need not be between total
deference under some version of a business judgment rule and total protection
of the minority’s established interests in the corporation. Using voice as a proxy
for the minority’s ability to advocate effectively for its own interests (and to
identify with specificity any wrongful conduct by the majority) would help
courts better tailor the level of review to the case at hand.
203. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 559 (N.C. 1983). The court identified those norms as
follows: “‘(1) the principle of majority rule in corporate management and (2) the business judgment
rule.’” Id. at 559 (quoting F. O’NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 9.04, at 582 (1975)).
204. Id. at 557 (citations omitted).
205. Id. at 559. Thus, in its effort to respect functional differences between publicly held and closely
held corporations, the court failed to also distinguish partnerships from closely held corporations.
206. Id. at 567 (“These findings indicate that the trial court applied incorrect legal standards . . . .”).
207. Id. The court’s instructions track the language of the North Carolina statute, which refers only
to the “rights and interests” of the minority shareholder and does not require a showing of oppression or
other majority misconduct. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30(2)(ii). Nevertheless, this simply restates the
question of what makes an expectation “reasonable.” The court seems to adopt implicitly the view that
a minority shareholder’s expectations need not be limited—at all—by the usual expectation that
majority shareholders have the right to control the business. However, the court did observe that the
expectation must have been “known or assumed by the other participants” and “the frustration [of the
expectation] was without fault of plaintiff and was in large part beyond his control.” Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d at 564; see also Royals v. Piedmont Elec. Repair Co., 529 S.E.2d 515, 520 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)
(noting that “a shareholder with an expectation in management cannot seek dissolution based upon a
frustration of this expectation if he never learns the business nor attends corporate management
meetings”).
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2. Efficiency Justifications for Varied Scrutiny
A voice-based framework also would be more efficient than current doctrine
because varied scrutiny places the burden of production (or elevated pleading)
on the party best able to meet it.208 When the minority lacks an active role in the
management of the corporation, the majority has better, if not sole, access to
information relevant to the litigation. If a legitimate business reason exists, the
majority should be able to provide it. If a decision rests on improper grounds
but could conceivably be legitimate, an inactive minority shareholder may have
nothing beyond circumstantial evidence to offer the court.
Minority shareholders who participate in the meetings where decisions are
made and who review the information relevant to those decisions are better able
to challenge the majority’s conduct in court and to offer the court evidence that
the majority’s conduct lacks a legitimate business purpose. Courts can expect,
and may require, a higher level of pleading from a minority shareholder with
voice. Participation thus enables the oppressed minority shareholder to proceed
to court armed with evidence and protects the corporation from the minority
shareholder who is simply disgruntled.209
Problems can result when a court ignores the issue of access to information.
For example, in a case concerning failure of several related close corporations
to declare adequate dividends, Oregon’s Supreme Court placed the burden of
proof on the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff had been excluded from
participation.210 Indeed, the court went further and rejected the plaintiff’s
evidence of lack of proper business purpose precisely because the majority
shareholders were the insiders with direct knowledge of the true situation:
In rebuttal, plaintiff contends that the directors did not really make their
decisions on the basis of these factors, pointing to testimony that they did not
rely on any documented financial analysis to support their dividend declara-
tions. This is a matter for consideration, but it is certainly not determinative.
All of the directors of these corporations were active in the business on a
day-to-day basis and had intimate first-hand knowledge of financial condi-
tions and present and projected business needs. In order to substantiate their
testimony that the above factors were taken into consideration, it was not
208. As discussed above, supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text, it might be objected that there
is an efficiency cost associated with any judicial intervention, and that the choice of form—with
locked-in status for minority shareholders—should be presumed deliberate. In other words, courts
should not seek to rewrite the parties’ bargain. This is a complex issue, and a full analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article, but the availability of newer, contract-based LLC business forms would seem to
indicate a continuing role for court oversight of shareholder oppression, even from a choice-of-form
perspective. Investors who select the close corporation form do so against a background of judicial
protection of minority shareholder interests.
209. The participation-based and information-based arguments for voice are related. A rational
majority must understand that the minority’s access to information about a contested decision could
form the basis for an eventual petition for judicial relief. Thus, the availability of judicial review should
limit the majority’s ability to erect an artifice of minority voice while studiously ignoring it.
210. Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 560 P.2d 1086, 1090 (Or. 1977).
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necessary that they provide documentary evidence or show that formal studies
were conducted. Their testimony is believable, and the burden of proof on this
issue is on the plaintiff, not the defendants.211
The court’s reliance on the credibility of insiders with no supporting objective
evidence made plaintiff’s burden all but insurmountable. As the court’s opinion
acknowledges, plaintiff was able to argue “that the change in compensation
policy, coinciding as it did with his departure from active involvement in the
business, [was] evidence of a concerted effort by the other shareholders to
wrongfully deprive him of his right to a fair proportion of the profits” and that
“each corporation had substantial retained earnings.”212 The plaintiff was not on
the board of directors, was not present when the decisions were made, and was
not privy to the information on which they were based.
By contrast, a California appellate court was rightly skeptical of claims
brought by a minority shareholder who had failed to bring her criticisms to the
attention of the majority shareholder.213 Despite believing that an infomercial
critical to the product launch would not succeed, she told the majority share-
holder a different story:
The infomercial was taped on October 26, 1993. As [the minority share-
holder] watched the taping from a control booth, she could tell it was a
“disaster” . . . and did not have a “snowball’s chance” of successfully generat-
ing sales. However, she kept her opinion to herself. Instead, she sent . . . a
memorandum in which she stated, “Now that we have completed our beauti-
ful infomercial, and even before we go to air, I think we are all feeling the
impending success we’ll be realizing . . . .”214
The court held that the minority shareholder lacked standing to bring a direct
action because the harm alleged was to the corporation and noted that it was
unlikely that she could establish the prerequisites for a derivative claim in that
“[a] minority shareholder has a wide range of statutory rights to help her
participate in the management of the corporation. . . . [and t]here was no allega-
tion made or evidence adduced that [the plaintiff] attempted to avail herself of
any of them.”215 Even though the court’s analysis of the minority shareholder’s
abdication of responsibility was specific to the context of a derivative claim, the
same issue has relevance in the context of a direct claim as well. Enhanced
scrutiny of corporate decisions that could have been addressed earlier would be
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1088.
213. See Nelson v. Anderson, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753 (Ct. App. 1999). The business was formed “for
the purpose of marketing skin care products,” and the majority shareholder, Loni Anderson, was a
television actress. Id. at 756. The minority shareholder, Nancy Nelson, was also a television personality.
Id. at 757.
214. Id. at 758–59.
215. Id. at 763 n.8.
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inefficient. Courts have a significant role to play when minority shareholders are
unable to participate, not when they choose not to do so.
Under the proposed voice-based model, a controlling shareholder might
choose to operate the corporation as a personal fiefdom but could not also
demand judicial deference.216 Those corporations that carefully observe corpo-
rate formalities can more reasonably ask courts to respect majority rule as well
as the business judgment standard that gives latitude to managers of public
corporations. Where close corporations fail to observe ordinary corporate proce-
dures, or otherwise deny minority shareholders an opportunity to meaningfully
participate in the decisionmaking process, there is more reason to worry that the
majority may be misusing the corporate form to advance its own interests.
D. UNDESIRABLE ALTERNATIVES: MANDATED VOICE OR PURE EXIT
This Article’s contention that minority shareholder voice merits careful judi-
cial attention in the analysis of shareholder oppression claims might be criti-
cized from at least two perspectives.217 Some might argue that the argument
does not go far enough and that minority shareholder voice should be required,
not simply considered after the fact. Others have contended that the answer to
minority shareholder oppression is exit, not voice.218 Neither position under-
mines this Article’s central claims.
1. Why Not Mandate Voice?
One might ask why courts or legislatures should not simply mandate minority
shareholder voice if it is so important. While specific advance planning is
extremely important, mandatory voice provisions would cause at least as many
problems as they would solve.
For example, voting restrictions can impede efficient management, causing a
risk of deadlocks, and majority shareholders may balk at handing disproportion-
ate power to the minority.219 In addition, abusive shareholders may forfeit the
right of participation. It would be perverse to penalize corporations that investi-
gate and take appropriate action to remedy sexual harassment or other improper
conduct by a director, officer, or employee.
216. Like the risk of veil piercing, limitations on minority participation would be a factor for
controlling shareholders to consider in deciding how to run the business.
217. A more fundamental objection, which, of course, applies to any doctrine of minority share-
holder oppression, is that parties are free to bargain for all rights they value and should be presumed to
have done so. As discussed, supra note 31 and accompanying text, that view is premised on an
unrealistic view of the shareholder relationship and bargaining process, at least for family corporations.
Also, given the delayed-harm aspect of the problem, it seems unsatisfying to declare, sternly, “you
made your bed, now you must lie in it.” The bed’s occupant may be a generation or more removed from
the misguided founder who put rocks in the pillows.
218. See, e.g., Blackmar, supra note 45; Matheson & Maler, supra note 11.
219. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 90, at 284–85 (offering governance concerns as a reason
not to adopt regulatory protections for minority shareholders that would enable them to disrupt the
business and to extract disproportionate benefits).
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The possibility of minority shareholder oppression appears to be an unavoid-
able side effect of the close corporation form.220 Mandatory voice provisions
would not work, ultimately, because no solution is right for every corporation,
and minority holdouts are no less serious a potential problem than majority
abuse of control.221 Accordingly, courts will have to evaluate claims of minority
shareholder oppression on a case-by-case basis—as they already do.222 Apply-
ing a level of judicial scrutiny inversely proportional to the amount of voice
given the minority offers the best method for efficiently and predictably achiev-
ing a sound result.
2. Why Not Eliminate Fault and Create an Automatic Exit Right?
Rather than seek the impossible—designing rules for close corporations that
preserve their essential features while making shareholder oppression impos-
sible—some focus on the wasteful expense of the resulting litigation. In that
vein, a significant body of scholarship advocates a statutory right of exit that
would eliminate the need for minority shareholders to show fault and would
guarantee the liquidity of their investment.223 The argument is sometimes
positioned as an analogy to the no-fault divorce.224
The statutory approach, however, creates more problems than it solves. First,
an automatic exit right undermines the significance of the close corporate form
and the shareholders’ interest in having a locked investment.225 From the ex
ante perspective, it is not clear that any shareholders would benefit from a rule
that left their investment exposed.226 Undermining the stability of the corporate
220. Indeed, the strong principle of majority rule evolved in part to avoid issues of minority
dominance and the oppression of the majority which could result when unanimity was required.
Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 659 (citing Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, supra note 49, at 11–14).
221. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 823 (“[O]ne size does not fit all. Rules that work well for
some [close corporation] investors will prove a straightjacket for others.”).
222. Indeed, some scholars believe that courts should deny minority shareholders protections that
those shareholders could have bargained for. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 90, at 273. To
the extent a doctrine of minority shareholder oppression creates non-binding default rules, however, this
concern seems overstated. Sophisticated parties are free to allocate rights and responsibilities differ-
ently, all of which can be priced in to the valuation of majority and minority ownership stakes. There
are many reasons why shareholders may not alter the default rules, even when they are undesirable. In
close corporations, shareholders may lack sophistication, may avoid bargaining because of delicate
family relationships, or may not be able to afford the investment of time and money required to modify
the default rules for a fledgling business that has little or no current profitability.
223. See J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977); Matheson &
Maler, supra note 11, at 662.
224. See, e.g., Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 691; Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression
and “Fair Value”: Of Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DUKE L.J.
293, 369 (2004) [hereinafter Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”].
225. By contrast, “[p]ublic corporations are built on, and defined by, exit rights.” Palmiter, supra
note 146, at 12.
226. See Rock & Wachter, Waiting For the Omelet To Set, supra note 6, at 920 (emphasizing
importance of locked-in investments—metaphorically, to permit the corporate omelet to set); Thomp-
son, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, supra note 9, at 702 (stating that the traditional
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form would also require creditors to worry about the potential consequences of
“a relatively trivial falling out among the equity investors,” and this monitoring
burden and uncertainty would reduce the attractiveness of the investment from
the creditor’s perspective, “thus raising the cost of capital.”227
Second, because of the lack of an established market for shares, creating
liquidity for close corporations creates considerable valuation difficulties.228
Litigation concerning exit rights would not necessarily be less costly than
shareholder oppression lawsuits brought pursuant to existing doctrine, which
requires some showing of harm before any remedy is available.
Third, the statutory approach dismisses the instrumental and normative value
of minority shareholder voice and misses the complex interaction of exit and
voice. As Hirschman persuasively argued, exit and voice are dynamic, poten-
tially complementary mechanisms.229 While some boost in exit could enhance
voice by backing it with credible threat, shareholder litigation may already
serve that function. If the threat of exit becomes too strong, given the need for
locked investment, then minority shareholder demands may overwhelm sensible
decisionmaking.
Finally, to the extent the argument for a statutory right of exit presumes that
the relationship of shareholders in close corporations is akin to that of partners
and that the partnership right of exit should apply equally to close corporations,
the argument overlooks important differences between shareholders and part-
ners:
[I]t is obvious that close corporate shareholders do not have a relationship that
even approaches the interdependency of partners. Shareholders are not agents
of the corporation and therefore cannot cause the corporation to incur liabili-
ties. Even more significant is that unlike partners, shareholders are not liable
for the debts of their corporation. These marked differences eviscerate any
claim that shareholders in a close corporation are in an “incorporated partner-
ship,” or even that these two groups of investors are similarly situated.230
corporate norm of “permanence permits the board to make long-term plans and lessens the potential
financial impact occasioned by minority shareholders opportunistically withdrawing or threatening to
withdraw their money capital”); id. at 706 (“Withdrawal of an investor’s capital comes at a cost to the
remaining participants—they may have to reduce the size of their business, take out a potentially costly
loan, or seek a new shareholder.”).
227. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 831. Bainbridge also criticizes “liberal partnership-like dissolu-
tion rights” as “a significant negative externality” because of the impact on potential creditors. Id. at
830. Although this latter point may at first appear to be inconsistent with Bainbridge’s observation
about the cost of capital—that is, that creditors will seek to pass along their risk in the form of higher
loan costs to the corporation—Bainbridge’s larger point seems to be that the inefficient corporate
governance rule would reduce the total amount of investment, impacting the wealth of both potential
creditors and close corporations that would have welcomed additional capital.
228. See Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value,” supra note 224, at 295.
229. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 3, at 4–5.
230. Siegel, supra note 1, at 437–38.
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Unless bargained for in advance, therefore, exit rights should not be available
on demand in the close corporation context. As discussed below, a voice-based
framework would assist courts in evaluating on a case-by-case basis whether
minority shareholders are entitled to relief.
IV. APPLYING THE VOICE-BASED FRAMEWORK
Courts can adopt a voice-based framework along the lines recommended in
this Article within the context of a variety of existing approaches to shareholder
oppression. In large part, this Article aims to provide a better descriptive
account of existing law, emphasizing issues of voice and scrutiny, and its
proposal can be thought of as a refinement of current law that would not require
special authorizing legislation. However, consistent with the best interpretation
of existing law, the proposal offers a basis for limiting prior decisions that too
rigidly apply corporate or partnership norms inconsistent with the nature of
close corporation governance. This Part illustrates the applicability of the
voice-based framework to Bad Faith, Fiduciary Duty, and Reasonable Expecta-
tions approaches.
A. BAD FAITH
While Delaware has rejected the concept of an independent cause of action
for oppression,231 and has refused to offer any “special” protection to minority
shareholders in close corporations232 its courts enforce ordinary fiduciary duties
and judge corporate decisions made by controlling shareholders, sometimes
under a strict “entire fairness” approach.233 Professor Robert Thompson has
recently observed that Delaware’s seemingly inconsistent approach to fiduciary
duty in fact embodies the principle of varied scrutiny: “[A]ll of these apparently
disparate standards fit within the same space for judicial review that can be
defined between deference on one end (characterized by the business judgment
rule) and more intensive judicial review on the other end (identified as ‘entire
fairness’ or intrinsic fairness).”234
Delaware courts already consider various factors reflecting possible board
self-dealing in assigning a level of scrutiny in public corporation litigation. To
adopt this Article’s proposal, Delaware courts would add minority shareholder
voice as a trigger for enhanced scrutiny in the close corporation context.235
231. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380–81 (Del. 1993).
232. Id.
233. See Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 684 (“Typically, Delaware courts review corporate
decisions under the deferential business judgment rule. However, as the court in Nixon explained, the
entire fairness test is implicated when the directors are on both sides of the transaction.” (citation
omitted)).
234. Robert B. Thompson, Delaware’s Disclosure: Moving the Line of Federal-State Corporate
Regulation, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 167, 169.
235. See Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 684 (“The entire fairness analysis essentially requires
‘judicial scrutiny.’” (quoting Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1376)).
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Board decisions concerning salary, employment, and dividends are ordinarily
protected by the business judgment rule.236 When minority shareholders are
excluded from participation, however, the controlling shareholders would be
required to show the “entire fairness” of challenged corporate decisions, even
for decisions concerning dividends or employment that do not necessarily
involve self-dealing.237 In Delaware, then, a voice-based framework would
extend the logic of varied scrutiny (and of bad faith) to permit Delaware courts
to police possible abuses of majority shareholder discretion without undermin-
ing the close corporation form.
B. FIDUCIARY DUTY
The Wilkes test established in Massachusetts suggests one way that a Fidu-
ciary Duty approach could be modified to take into account issues of minority
voice.238 The existing test, which requires the majority shareholders to establish
the legitimate business purpose of challenged decisions,239 overturns the busi-
ness judgment rule’s presumption and is especially well suited to close corpora-
tions without substantial minority participation.
However, Massachusetts may provide too much protection to minority share-
holders who already have voice and should be able to allege with specificity
why any particular business decisions were improper. (To always place the
burden on the controlling shareholder is to overturn the ordinary presumption of
business judgment and to risk inserting courts into the middle of every business
disagreement.) As a corollary to the Wilkes test, then, Massachusetts courts
might implement this Article’s recommendation by requiring minority sharehold-
ers with full rights of participation to meet the burden of showing that the
majority’s actions lacked justification.
Expanding the flexibility of the Wilkes test to reflect the nature of the close
corporation at issue would reserve intensified review for those close corpora-
tions most likely to ignore the interests of minority shareholders. Courts should
not simply protect minority interests, regardless of business justification, and
should instead apply the scrutiny-based model advocated in this Article to
achieve more business-sensitive results without abandoning minority sharehold-
ers.
236. See Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action, supra note 9, at 703 (observing that “[t]he
majority may even be able to deny the minority shareholder any return in the long run by siphoning off
corporate assets in the form of high salaries or rents, insulated from judicial review by the business
judgment rule”).
237. Under existing Delaware law, only if minority shareholders can show that the majority has, in
fact, taken a disproportionate benefit to the exclusion of minority shareholders will the majority be
obligated to show the “entire fairness” of the transaction. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717, 720 (Del. 1971).
238. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
239. See id. at 663.
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C. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
Courts adopting a Reasonable Expectations approach in some respects come
closest to the approach recommended in this Article, in that they already tend to
give explicit priority to voice. In such jurisdictions, the voice-based framework
might improve judicial analysis by making it less flexible and more predictable.
Before attempting to evaluate the nature of the parties’ bargain, which may
involve conflicting testimony and an examination of years’ worth of corporate
records, an initial assessment of the minority’s voice would usefully calibrate
the intensity of the court’s scrutiny. Given the costs and disruption of litigation
for the corporation, as well as the judicial resources involved, courts should not
aim to police shareholder relationships to identify and correct all instances of
overreaching.
Accordingly, minority shareholders with voice would have the burden of
establishing a clear violation of their objectively reasonable expectations and
would as a result be less likely to use litigation to impose costs on majority
shareholders, who are entitled to control the direction of the business.240 If
minority shareholders have been deprived of voice, however, then the majority
would be required to show that the challenged conduct is consistent with the
minority’s reasonable expectations. Ultimately, the court’s aim should be to
ensure that the majority has a business justification and not to enhance the value
of the minority’s investment at the expense of other shareholders. Placing the
burden on the majority reflects nothing more than the fact that concentrated
power without any check is likely to be abused.241
CONCLUSION
Emphasis on the immediate problem of exit in the context of close corpora-
tion shareholder litigation causes courts and commentators to discount the
continuing relevance of voice, both to identifying and remedying oppression. A
voice-based model, applying enhanced scrutiny to close corporations that de-
prive minority shareholders of voice, creates appropriate incentives for inclu-
sive governance of close corporations in the best interest of all shareholders.
240. See In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984) (“It would be contrary to
[the dissolution statute’s] remedial purpose to permit its use by minority shareholders as merely a
coercive tool.” (citations omitted)); In re Dubonnet Scarfs, Inc., 105 A.D.2d 339, 343 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (rejecting notion that shareholder in close corporation “can demand to be bought out . . . and that
if such demand is not complied with, then such shareholder can seek the dissolution of that corpora-
tion”).
241. See Moll, The Unanswered Question, supra note 42, at 757; Rock & Wachter, Waiting for the
Omelet To Set, supra note 6, at 916; Siegel, supra note 1, at 383–84.
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